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CHAPl'ER 1 
In recent years insider trading has received considerable attention. 
Insiders are persons who possess information about a firm which is not 
available to the general public. This information is typically acquired as a 
by-product of activities performed by the insider for his corporate employer. 
The majority of insiders occupy top positions in the corporate hierarchy, 
though large stockholders and others may also have access to such knowledge. 
The costs incurred by the insider to produce or procure this information are 
negligible; however, once in his possession, this information is potentially 
valuable. This value arises from an insider's ability to profitably 
speculate in his corporation's stock or other securities. Based upon his 
special nonpublic knowledge, an insider can purchase securities prior to an 
impending rise in price or sell prior to an impending decline. The recent 
attention devoted to insider trading has been due to widespread concern 
regarding the consequences this practice may have on individuals, 
corporations, and the functioning of securities markets. 
Prior to the stock market collapse of 1929, insider trading was conm::>nly 
practiced and generally aa:::epted throughout the stock market. However, with 
the onslaught of the Great Depression, public sentiment changed dramatically. 
Insider trading became widely perceived as an ethically reprehensible practice 
in which unscrupulous businessmen attempt to profit at the expense of their 
corporations' shareholders. Indeed, during the Congressional hearings of 
1933-1934, insider trading was labeled a major factor contributing to the , 
economic collapse. (1) Furtherl1Ore, since no countervailing benefits were 
associated with the practice, its regulation was seen as readily justifiable. 
Consequently, to prOl1Ote the notion of fairness in the marketplace for 
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securities, regulations of insider trading were introduced under Section 16 of 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 
The Securities Exchange Act was designed to regulate the trading of 
securities on organized exchanges. Section 16(a) of the Act formally defines 
insiders as corporate officers, directors, or owners of ten percent or more of 
a corporation's stock. FUrthermore, it requires that these insiders register 
all transactions involving their corporation's securities with the Securities 
and Exchange CcxTmission (SOC). Section 16 (b), known as the 'short swing' 
rule, outlaws any coatJined purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) occuring 
within a six month period. Liability under this law is determined 
mechanically; that is, whether an insider is guilty of a 16(b) violation is 
determined irrespective of how much evidence is adduced of unfair resort to 
nonpublic knowledge. Finally, Section 16(c) prohibits an insider from selling 
short his corporation's stock. 
In 1942 the SEC created what is now considered the cornerstone of federal 
insider trading laws: RIle lOb-So This statute makes it illegal for a person 
to make false or misleading statements or to neglect to state a mater ial fact 
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. RIle 10b-S is 
sometimes referred to as the 'disclose or abstain' rule since it requires that 
when making a security transaction, a person must truthfully disclose all 
material information upon which his trade is based or abstain from trading. 
Until the 1960's insider trading was widely perceived as an unfair and 
~mful practice for which regulation was necessary and justified. This 
opinion emphasizing its undesirability came to be known as the traditional 
view. In 1966 Henry Manne [31J published his book Insider Trading and the 
Stock Market which challenged the traditional way of thinking by asserting 
that the case against insider trading was overstated. FUrthernore, he 
enphasized potential benefits from insider trading, thereby questioning the 
justification for the regulations. Though Manne's arguments were largely 
discounted by traditional thinkers, his book sparked a controversy over the 
desirability of regulations governing insider trading. 
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On one side of this controversy are the traditionalists, who argue that 
insider trading i s harmful for several reasons. First, it injures individuals 
because it causes a redistribution of wealth from outside investors to 
insiders. Second, they claim that this practice harms corporations by 
providing an incentive for managers to make poor decisions. AOO third, it is 
argued that insider trading leads to an allocationally and informationally 
less less efficient securities market. For the.se reasons proponents of the 
traditional view fervently support regulations of insider trading. 
Critics of the traditional view first assert that the harm to individuals 
from insider trading is overstated, and that, in fact, insider trading is 
beneficial to firms because it serves as a unique form of remuneration for 
innovative activity within the corporation. Second, it is argued that this 
practice provides incentives for the rapid dissemination of information 
thereby contributing to accurate pricing of securities. AOO finally, ir£ider 
trading is said to prevent the misallocation of resources toward the socially 
wasteful production of information. Although this debate between the 
traditionalists and their critics remains unresolved, regulatory policy toward 
insider trading has always favored the former viewpoint. 
Since 1978 the SEX:: has been engaged in an ongoing crackdown against 
insider trading which has resulted in the filing of charges in more cases than 
in the previous 44 years of its governance over insiders. (2) Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of these actions in thwarting illegal behavior is 
questionable. (3) As one highly placed SEX:: official has stated, "The greed of 
1-4 
people in high places, as well as average people, presents an insurmountable 
obstacle ... (4) Not only are trading violations difficult to detect, but even 
when suspects are apprehended, convictions are nearly inpossible to obtain. 
In fact, since 1934, only six people have ever been convicted on criminal 
charges of violating insider trading proscriptions, and one conviction was 
later overturned. (5) Trading on inside information has been described by one 
Congressman as "a ganbl.e many are willirg to take, since criminal sanctions 
are rarly sought by the Justice Department. n (6) Amid mountirg criticism of its 
history of lenient settlements, the SEC has renewed efforts to expand its 
current enforcement powers against insiders. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of current 
regulations of insider trading. In the past, examinations of regulatory 
effectiveness have been solely concerned with analyses of the . excess returns 
earned by insiders from their trading actiovities in the stock market. This 
~tudy, however, involves a JOOre direct approach to the problem. It is assumed 
that for regulations to be effect~ve, two conditions must be satisfied. 
First, they must be stated in a manner which prohibits all types of behavior 
which would be considered harmful. Second, the regulations must be enforced 
to the point where the marginal enforcement costs are no greater than the 
marginal loss from JOOre insider trading. It is the thesis of this paper that 
current regulations of insider trading are neither accurately stated nor 
adeguately enforced thereby enabling insiders to reap excess returns from 
their tradirg activities in the stock and options markets. 
The study will be structured as follows. Olapter 2 presents the 
traditional view of insider tradirg alorg with several alternative theories. 
Olapter 3 presents an in-depth examination of the intentions of insider 
trading regulations as well as the methods and difficulties associated with 
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their enforcement. Chapter 4 describes past empirical studies and discusses 
their implications regarding regulatory effectiveness. In Chapter 5 the 
regulations of insider trading are shown to contain loopholes which allow 
insiders to follow trading strategies which are faithful to the language but 
not the intent of these proscriptions. In ClIapter 6 a Irethodology is 
presented for testing regulatory effectiveness, and the results of this test 
are presented in Chapter 7. Finally, Chapter 8 discusses policy implications 
and contains concluding remarks. 
FCOmOre> TO CHAPl'ER 1 
(1) W. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street (Cantlridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1926), cited by Mackay and Reid [28J, 
p. 108. 
(2) "Wall Street Ib.lbts the SOC Will CUrtail Insider Trading," 
(51] • 
(3) See Bleiberg (4) ; Blustein (5); Crock [7]; Louis [27] . 
(4) Louis [27J, p. 72. 
(5) Kosterlitz [24J, p. 21. 
(6) Marcial [31J, p. 82. 
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The effects of the security transactions of corporate insiders on traders 
who do not have access to nonpublic information regarding the corporation, and 
on the functioning of securities markets in general has been the subject of a 
long, acrim:mious and, as yet, unresolved debate. The nature of this 
controversy, in its sinplest form, centers around the question, "Are the 
existing regulations of insider trading justified?" Respondents to this 
question have endorsed one of t-lolO opposing schools of thought. The older and 
more widely held theory, referred to as the traditional view, proposes that 
insider trading is harmful to both individual traders and the normal operation 
of securities markets, and should, therefore, be regulated. In opposition to 
the traditional view, several alternative theories have been proposed 
emphasizing the potential benefits from insider trading. These criticisms 
assert that current regulations of insider trading cannot be justified without 
giving consideration to the countervailing benefits from this practice. Thus 
far, the critics have been unable to produce any relevant empirical studies 
supporting their assertions, and, despite the fact that current regulatory 
policies and enforcement activities firmly embrace traditional ways of 
thinking, the controversy remains unresolved. To facilitate a detailed 
development of these two opposing views, it is first necessary to make several 
asswnptions. 
It is assumed that securities markets are composed of two distinct types 
of traders: insiders and outsiders. Insiders are distinguished by two 
characteristics. First, they are able to obtain information regarding the 
future profitability of their corporation no later than outsiders. Insiders 
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are privy to this information by virtue of their relationship with their 
=rporation (e.g., officer, director, or large shareholder). Because insiders 
always obtain their information no later than outsiders, and because they 
usually have the power to determine when this information is disclosed to the 
public, they are relatively accurate predicbors of future price movements. 
Specifically, insiders possess the ability to predict when, in what direction, 
and, to some extent, the magnitude of future price changes in their 
corporation's stock. This fact gives the insider a substantial trading 
advantage in securities markets. 
The second distinguishing characteristic of insiders is that they are able 
to acquire information at a marginal cost of zero. (1) In other words, their 
information is acquired in the course of making decisions or performing duties 
for their =rporate enployer. In contrast, this information is relatively 
=stly for outsiders to obtain prior to its release. 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to describing in greater 
detail the nature of the debate between the traditionalists and their critics. 
Several arguments favoring the former viewpoint shall be presented, followed 
by several alternative theories. 
The earliest of all traditional arguments cOncerns the notion of fairness. 
The practice of insider trading has been considered 'unfair' because insiders 
are able to base their trading decisions on information which is not available 
to outsiders. The unfairness ar ises not only because insiders acquire their 
information before outsiders, but also because there exists no lawful means by 
which the outsider may remove the insider's informational advantage. (2) 
It was this overriding concern for fairness which provided the inpetus for 
the regulation of insider trading and of security markets in general. Indeed, 
the purpose of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, as stated in its prean'ble, 
was "[t]o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges ••• to prevent 
inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges •••• "(3) 
Although the perception that insider trading is unfair involves no 
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economic considerations, it remains a popular justification for the regulation 
of this practice. (4) Schotland [411 does not underestimate the iJrportance of 
equity considerations when he states: 
Even if we found that unfettered insider trading would bring an economic 
gain, we might still forego that gain in order to secure a stock market 
and intracorporate relationships that satisfy such noneconomic goals as 
fairness, just rewards and integrity.(S) 
Even though insider trading may offend our basic notions of fairness, such 
normative judgements carry little weight in economic circles. Arguing from an 
economic standpoint, traditionalists contend that insider trading is unfair 
because it represents the risk of direct harm to outsiders. Direct injury 
occurs when an outsider trades directly with an insider. For instance, if an 
outsider purchases shares fram an insider who is selling based on negative, 
nonpublic information, then injury occurs when that information is disclosed 
and the outsider's shares decline in price. Similarly, when an outsider sells 
his shares to an inSider, he foregos the gain associated with the eventual 
rise in price. Assuming that insiders' trades are always profitable, then 
allowing insiders to trade freely inplies a direct redistribution of wealth 
from the uninformed outsiders to the insiders. In other words, the gains 
accruing to insiders equal the losses incurred by outsiders. 
The traditionalists present further testimony against insider trading by 
extending their argument that this practice leaves outsiders at an unfair 
disadvantage. It is asserted that when insiders are permitted to trade 
freely, outsiders realize they are at a disadvantage and consequently lose 
confidence in the stock market. Schotland contends that the exploitation of 
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valuable information by insiders 
will tend to discourage outsiders' participation in the stock market, 
which in turn will tend to reduce the health of that market and have a 
negative inpact on corporations already held publicly, on smaller 
corporations which may need rore capital to grow and on the economy as a 
whole. (6) 
Recall that insiders, by definition, are the managers of corporations, and 
that outsiders, by virtue of their stockholdings, can be considered owners of 
corporations. Hence, in this light, the loss of confidence by outsiders can 
be viewed as a consequence of the conflict of interest between the managers 
and owners of a firm. The rationale for this conflict can be stated in 
greater detail. First, managers have the incentive to speculate in their 
corporation's stock based on information they acquire as a by-product of their 
corporate functions. EUrtherrore, gains accruing to managers as a result of 
their trading activity will be at the expense of (actual or potential) 
shareholders. Hence, a conflict arises because the incentive exists for 
managers to violate their fiduciary duty to the owners of the firm. A 
fiduciary duty requires that managers atteIlpt to act in the best interests of 
shareholders. (7) 
Since it is in the firm's best interest to prevent practices which would 
have a negative impact-on the welfare of shareholders, possible support for 
this theory may be manifested in attenpts by firms to limit the trading 
activity of their corporate officers. Indeed, Avon Products and Union Carbide 
have both imposed trading restrictions on their managers which are rore severe 
than the current regulations(S) 
The indirect or social harm caused by insider trading can be presented in 
rore concrete terms by considering risks and returns. Consider two firms X 
and Y which are alike in all respects except that insider trading occurs in 
security X but not in security Y. As a consequence, outsiders who trade 
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security X have a positive probability of trading with an insider and thus run 
a greater risk of incurring a loss or forgoing a gain than those outsiders who 
trade security Y. Begin by assuming that the public is aware of the 
distinction between the two companies. This implies that each outsider will 
either avoid trading security X or will demand that it pay a higher return 
than security Y. (9) A recent incident involving possibly illegal insider 
trading activity in the shares of Warner CoJll1llnications Inc. may serve to 
illustrate this point. (10) 
Beginning early in the fall of 1982, warner stock began soaring amid 
widespread enthusiasm over the prospects for its highly profitable Atari 
division. Meanwhile, however, nine warner insiders were busy selling more 
than $7.7 million worth of warner OO!I1IOn shares. Then, in early DeceITber, the 
entertainment c:onpany released a lower-than-expected fourth-quarter earnings 
projection which triggered a massive selling spree. Within several days after 
the announcement, Warner stock had plunged nearly 50 percent. Several weeks 
later Warner publicly revealed that several insiders had sold shares prior to 
the announcement. It is apparent that this development has led same pecple to 
avoid trading shares of Warner stock. One analyst was quoted as saying, "I 
will never again trust the peq>le who now run warner, " while another advised 
investors to "stay away from the stock. n (11) 
Once again consider the two companies X and Y; however, now ~ that 
outsiders are unable to distinguish any difference between the two concerns. 
That is, the public is rot aware that insider trading occurs in security X but 
rot in security Y. According to Srudney [6J, 
A rational buyer (or seller) in a market, who knows the person with whom 
he is dealing has mater ial information about the value of the product 
being exchanged which he could rot lawfully acquire, will either refrain 
from dealing with that transactor or demand a risk premium. If the market 
is thought to be systematically populated with such transactors sc:rne 
investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will incur 
costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome 
their unerodable informational advantages. None of these responses is 
socially useful. (12) 
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In other words, outsiders are now apprehensive about trading the shares of 
either security X or Y. Although it is known that less insider trading goes 
on in one of the companies, outsiders are not sure which company that is. 
Hence, it must be assumed that both securities present an equal and positive 
risk of wealth losses due to insider trading. (13) Investors will now command a 
higher return from both securities and consequently the market will became 
less allocationally efficient. Allocational efficiency refers to the ability 
of a market to ,allocate resources to their highest valued use. In this case, 
insider trading leads to reduced allocational efficiency because both Ccrtpany 
X and Carpany Y must pay a higher return thereby raising the cost of equity 
financing to these two firms. (14) Thus, the traditionalists argue, it is 
necessary to regulate insider trading in order to maintain allocational 
efficiency in securities markets. 
Tb provide further support for their viewpoint, traditionalists examine 
the effects of insider trading on. informational efficiency. Informational 
efficiency refers to the speed with which information is incorporated in 
security ' prices. A market is less informationally efficient the longer it 
takes for information to be reflected in prices. It is argued that in a 
market in which insiders are permitted to trade freely the disclosure of 
information is unnecessarily delayed. (15) Insiders cannot realize the gains 
from their trades until their information is released causing pr ices to 
adjust. However, insiders have the incentive to delay the disclosure thereby 
allowing themselves to execute trades ' at pr ices which do not reflect all known 
information. UJring the period of time between the discovery of information 
and its eventual release, securities are mispriced: i.e., the actual returns 
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deyiate from the returns that would be paid if all information were publicly 
ayailable. Consequently, capital reso..trces are terrporarily misallocated. (16) 
'Ibe traditionalists reason that if insider trading were regulated, then 
insiders could no longer profit from their special information, and thus, they 
Io'OUld haye no incentiYe to delay the release of that information. 
Finally, insider trading is perceiYed as harmful because it prOYides an 
incentiYe for managers to deliberately make poor decisions. (17) 'Ibe ability to 
sell stock short, buy put options, and write call options giYes security 
traders the opportunity to profit from declines in a stock's price. Since 
oonlDan stock represents shares of ownership in a corporation, changes in a 
stock's price represent changes in the market's assessment of the 
corresponding firm's profitability. Furthermore, since the decisions made by 
insiders directly affect their firms' future profitability, they can be said 
to haye some degree of control oyer thE! price of their conpany's stock. 
Consequently, the incentiYe exists for an insider to breach his fiduciary duty 
by deliberately making poor decisions and profiting from the subsequent price 
decline in his corporation's stock. Cbliously, a similar incentiYe exists for 
making good decisions; howeYer, traditionalists argue that allowing insiders 
to profit from both positiYe and negatiYe information will, at least, lead 
managers ' to choose riskier yentures. 'Ibis is because there is a direct 
relationship between the yariability of a project's outcome and the value of 
information relating to that outcome. (18) By regulating the trading actiYity 
of insiders, the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders can be 
eliminated. 
'!be traditionalists make five primary arguments against insider trading. 
First, they claim that insider trading is sinply unfair because insiders haye 
a distinct trading adYantage oyer outsiders due to their possession of 
2-8 
material, nonpublic information. Second, the assertion is made that insider 
trading is harmful because it directly injures those outsiders with whom the 
insiders trade. That is, sirx:e insiders' gains equal outsiders' losses, 
insider trading causes a redistribution of wealth from outsiders to insiders. 
Third, it is argued that, in addition to the direct harm, there exists an 
indirect harm fram insider trading which is manifested in an allocationally 
less efficient stock market. Specifically, because outsiders always run the 
risk of direct injury from trading with insiders, they tend to lose confiderx:e 
in the market. Consequently, outsiders either avoid trading altogether or 
demand a risk premium. This, in turn leads to allocational inefficiency by 
making equity funding nore expensive for all fiI1l5. Fourth, it is argued that 
insider trading unnecessarily delays the dissemination of information to the 
marketplace for securities. This also leads to allocational inefficiency by 
causing securities to become mispriced. Fifth, the traditionalists argue that 
insider trading provides .an incentive for managers to violate their fiduciary 
duty by deliberately making poor decisions. 
Originally, justification for the regulation of insider trading was based 
solely upon the traditionalists' first argument that this practice is unfair 
to outsiders. Because no countervailing benefits were believed to exist, 
regulation of insider trading was thought to be beneficial. In recent years, 
however, a small but vocal group of critics bringing economic reasoning to 
bear on the subject have challenged this traditional viewpoint. According to 
these critics, current justification for the regulation of insider trading is 
based on prima facie eviderx:e which fails to pay consideration to the 
potential benefits from the practice. In response to the contrary theories, 
traditionalists were pressed to strengthen their case against insider trading. 
Thus, the remainder of the traditional arguments arose in response to the 
critics' assertions. 
The first person to question the traditional justification for the 
regulation of insider trading was Henry G. Manne [31] in his book Insider 
Trading and the Stock Market published in 1966. In this pioneering work, 
Manne presents several arguments which he claims provide support for an 
alternative view that the harm fram insider trading is overstated, and, 
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fur thernnre , that insider trading is, in fact, beneficial to the fu~ticning 
of a capitalist scx:iety. The issues raised in this book, along with the 
extensive comnent they provoked, provided a foundation for the controversy 
surrounding the desirability of insider trading which, to this day, remains 
unresolved. The argument that the perceived harm from insider trading is 
overstated will be presented first. 
The . traditional view asserts that insider trading prevents outsiders fram 
realizing gains they otherwise would have had. Manne contends, however, that 
the gains received by insiders as a result of their trading activity cannot be 
construed as a 'loss' to outsiders. When insiders purchase shares of their 
corporation's stock in adv~e of an inpending i~rease in price, they are, in 
esse~e, exchanging the value of their publicly unknown information for an 
appreciation in the value of their shares. As insiders make their purchases, 
the price of all shares rises. Since the insiders do not own all outstanding 
shares of their corporation's stock, they cannot possibly capture the full 
value of their information when it is made public. Thus, outside shareholders 
who may have no knowledge of this information will also benefit from the rise 
in price. Essentially, the insiders have allowed outside shareholders to 
benefit from their information at no cost. This cx:curs because new value has 
been created. The insiders' gain is part of this newly created value, and 
this gain is not made at anyone's expense. Thus, since some outsiders have 
gained, all outsiders taken as a group do not necessarily lose as a result of 
insider trading. 
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Manne extends t his conclusion by presenting an ex ante argument that those 
outsiders who do trade directly with insiders are not necessarily harmed. To 
facilitate his argument Manne divides all securities traders (excluding 
insiders) into two groups: time function traders and price function traders. 
Time function traders can be thought of as long term holders or 'investors;' 
i.e., people whose decisions to buy or sell are based upon events unrelated to 
short term changes in price. For exarrple, persons who buy or sell because 
their long term investment needs have changed, or because they feel the 
investment climate has been altered due to some national or international 
event would be considered time function traders. Price function traders can 
be thought of as speculators, chartists, or persons engaging in arbitrage; 
i.e., persons whose trading decisions are a function of short term price 
fluctuations. Although differel"lCes between the two groups are not always 
clearcut, Manne's reasons for making the distinction will soon become clear. 
Manne's argument rests upon the implicit assumption that a lag exists 
between the time when information is first produced and the time when that 
information is publicly disseminated. If insider trading does not occur, then 
a full and rapid price adjustment will take place on the date of disclosure. 
On the other hand, if insiders are permitted to trade freely on the basis of 
their (positive) information, then they will gradually bid up a stock's price 
prior to the release date. To determine the extent of the injury to outsiders 
due to insider trading, Manne conpares the am:lUnt that outsiders gain by 
trading on positive information during the gradual price rise to the amount 
they would have had with the delayed but sharp price rise associated with 00 
insider trading. 
When insider trading is permitted and a stock's price is gradually bid up 
by the insiders' purchases, both time and price function traders will be 
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buying and selling shares in the market. Manne argues that time function 
traders, whether buying or selling, WQJld have done so regardless of the 
gradual upswing in price and, therefore, cannot be construed as losers. That 
is, even if insider trading were not occur ing (and the stock I s price was 
therefore stable prior to announcement), then these investors still WQJld have 
made their trades. (This is the reason for Manne I s distinction between time 
and price function traders.) Specifically, when a time function trader 
purchases stock as the price is being bid up by insiders, ' he benefits because 
he shares in the appreciation in value received by insiders. On the other 
hand, the time function trader who sells stock during the price rise is also 
better off. This is because his selling price is higher than that which would 
have pervailed if insiders were prevented from trading . In neither case can 
the time function traders be said to lose since their trading decisions are 
made independently of the price changes caused by insiders. 
Price function traders, however, are potential losers since their trades 
are induced by the price fluctuations attributed to insider trading. If 
insiders were not permitted in the market, then the price would remain stable 
(prior to the dissemination date), and the speculators WQJld probably not be 
trading. Specifically, price function traders lose ' if they sell to an insider 
since the price they receive is lower (in the case of positive information) 
than if they had not based their purchasing decision on price rrovements; 
however, they gain if they happen to purchase at the same time as insiders. 
Hence, when positive information is considered, allowing insiders to trade 
freely will have the following results. Positive gains accrue only to time 
function traders when they sell to insiders, while both time and price 
function traders will gain if they happen to buy at the same time as insiders. 
Negatively, any price function trader will lose if he sells when insiders are 
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buying. FurtherIlOre, any price function trader who would have purchased stock 
if there had been a rule preventing insider trading will also miss out on the 
price rise. 
In the case of positive information, the outsider is IIOre likely to 
benefit the less frequently shares are sold. In other words, the gains from 
allowing insider trading tend to accrue to time function traders while price 
function traders tend to lose. By limiting the discussion to long term 
investors rather than the short term speculators, Manne asserts that there is 
little likelihood for injury from insider trading. Recalling that time 
function traders benefit by selling to insiders as prices are bid up, Manne 
argues that these investors will benefit to a greater extent if the 
information is incorporated in price IIOre expediticnsly. He states that the 
traditional argument that insider trading is harmful to outsiders as a group 
is valid only if "price changes occur IIOre gradually with insider trading than 
without it."(19) If the alternative to insider trading were full and immediate 
disclosure of all information, then, Manne argues, prices would adjust IIOre 
slowly under insider trading, thus injuring time function traders. However, 
because full and immediate disclosure is not, and probably cannot be enforced, 
Manne concludes that the purported harm to outsiders from allowing insiders to 
trade freely is overstated. 
To lend further support to the critics' case, Manne proposes that insider 
trading is beneficial because it provides a necessary form of remuneration for 
"entrepreneurs." (20) Here, an enterpreneur is defined as being an ' innovator 
within the corporate organization. For various reascns Manne deduces that 
salaries, bonuses, and stock options provide inadequate incentives for the 
development of new methods of utilizing the factors of production. Given the 
limitations of these methods of payment, he then argues that allowing the 
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entrepreneur to trade on his inside knowledge would enable him to compensate 
himself with a reward which accuratlely reflects the worth of his innovations. 
Insider trading meets all the ccnditions for appropriately conpensating 
entrepreneurs. It readily allows corporate entrepreneurs to market their 
innovations •••• [Tlhis is not a direct marketing of the idea but rather a 
"sale" of information abalt an innovati<XI. Thus, although we do not allow 
entrepreneurs a direct proprietary interest in their ideas, we can allow 
recovery for their ideas by permitting them to exploit information about 
the existence of the ideas in a market primarily based on informati<XI. (21) 
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that insiders' ability to profit from 
bad news will not necessarily lead them to violate their fiduciary duty. 
Managers who produce negative information abalt their firm by deliberately 
making poor decisions will concurrently reduce the value of their human 
capital. Thus, the labor market serves to restrain management from 
deliberately making unsound decisions and profiting from the resulting 
negative information. (22) 
In his 1969 article, "Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stcck 
Market," Harold Demsetz (8] proposes that insider trading contributes to 
greater efficiency in the stock market. Demsetz's primary concern is with 
achieving and maintaining efficient markets. He rejects the predisposition 
that imperfections are necessarily undesirable by recognizing that there is a 
cost associated with their rellOVal. Demsetz states, "Conplete absense of 
imperfections is consistent with efficiency only if the cost of accomplishing 
this objective is zero." (23) Thus, if instituting regulations is the means by 
which ill¥?E!rfections are to be reduced, it is essential that some consideration 
be given to the likely costs and benefits involved. In particular, Demsetz 
examines the imperfection known as insider trading. 
Demsetz delineates the problem of insider trading into two separate 
issues. First there is the question of whether it is desirable for firms to 
enploy secrecy in an attenpt to increase their profits. This he calls the 
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"corporate use of secrecy." The second issue is raised by managerrent' s ability 
to realize personal gain from the information they obtain as a by-product of 
their corporate activities. 
To determine whether regulation of insider trading is justified, Demsetz 
first examines the desirability of the corporate use of secrecy. He asserts 
that corporate secrecy plays a necessary role in the incentive system, and 
thus its use should not be discouraged. Further!lOre, since achieving a 
reduction in the use of secrecy through regulation is such a large scale 
task, the costs involved would likely preclude any significant benefits. 
Demsetz observes that "there is little the SEC can do to eliminate collpletely 
the profits associated with the possession of valuable market knowledge." (24) 
Instead, he argues, the IroSt the SEC could hope to achieve is raising the cost 
to insiders of utilizing the !lOst obvious forms of insider trading (i.e., an 
insider trading his corporation's securities in his name). 
If the SEC does opt to regulate insider trading, Demsetz argues that 
valuable information will be made public with greater delay while insiders 
pursue less obvious, time consuming trading strategies (e.g., trading through 
'agents' or in the securities of corporations marketing substitute or 
canplementary goods). In other words, regulation of insider trading reduces 
insiders' incentives to release information quickly. The result is a delay in 
the adjustment of security prices to the level at which those prices reflect 
all known information. Permitting insiders to ellploy the IroSt direct methods 
of realizing a return from their information will tend to reduce the time 
period required for the inpounding of all informatioo in prices. Hence, 
conpared to a market in which insider trading is regulated, a noo-regulated 
market will be !lOre efficient in both an informatiooal and allocative sense. 
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Several of the arguments presented thus far, favoring both the traditional 
and alternative viewpoints, suffer from shortcomings. First, the 
traditionalists fail to recognize that incentives exist for insiders to 
produce and pr~tly disseminate their informatic.n. An insider basing his 
security trades on nonpublic knowledge cannot realize a return from his 
information until it is publicly disclosed thereby causing share prices to 
adjust to their new equilibrium level. Consequently, when insiders are 
permitted to trade, the incentive exists for informati()n to be produced. 
Furthermore, insiders have an incentive to disclose informatic.n promptly 
follcMing its production. Olring the period after an insider takes his 
security position but prior to his release of the relevant information, the 
value of his portfolio is subject to adverse price effects originating from 
other · sources. The insider can reduce this investment risk by disseminating 
his information and closing out his security position as soon after making his 
initial trade as possible. Thus, risk averse insiders have the incentive to 
promptly disclose information which they acquire. 
A second shortcoming suffered by traditional and alternative arguments 
alike is their failure to adequately address the subject of informational 
efficiency in security markets. In particular, these arguments do not explain 
why informational efficiency is desirable, nor do they pr()po5e a method for 
measuring the costs associated with a reduction in informational efficiency. 
At first blush, one is tempted to argue that informational efficiency is 
desirable because it leads to accurate pricing of securities thus ensuring 
that resources will be allocated to.rard their highest valued use. This 
assertion, though technically correct, is too vague to be of any use. 
Specifically, it fails to recognize that a lack of complete information 
regarding a security implies consequences unlike those resulting from 
incomplete information in other markets. These differences arise due to 
dissimilarities between sellers of securities and sellers of other goods. 
Taking the latter case first, CXlI1sider a market for used cars. (25) 
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In a used car market, sellers typically know the quality or value of the 
automobiles they are attempting to sell, while buyers are not privy to this 
knowledge. Hence, an asymetry in available information develops. As a 
consequence, those traders possessing IIDre information, i.e., the sellers, 
will avoid transactions at pr ices which fail to meet or exceed a car's true 
value. That is, no used cars will be sold at prices which understate their 
value based on all known information. 
Now consider a securities market in which those persons poSsessing inside 
information do not trade. In this case, if information regarding securities 
is known, but not publicly available, then it will not influence anyone's 
trading decisions. Thus, no asymetry in information exists between buyers and 
sellers. Nevertheless, since security prices fail to reflect all known 
information, trades occur at prices which do not reflect true value. 
FurtherllDre, since this information could be either positive or negative, some 
securities are underpriced while others are overpriced by the market. That 
is, same securities will yield returns that are too high while others will 
yield returns that are too low. Unlike prices in the used car market, 
security prices may be biased in both directions. Thus, it is not readily 
apparent that an informationally inefficient securities market is absolutely 
undesirable--some traders win, albeit inadvertently, while others lose. 
To determine whether incentives to acquire and disseminate information 
contribute to efficient resource allocation, it is IIDre useful to examine the 
nature of the information involved rather than the mispr icing that results in 
its absense. (26) A distinction will be made based upon whether the information 
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affects production. Information which is useful in making production 
decisions is referred to as operational information. In general, c:perational 
information pertains to the recognition of something that already exists but 
IIKlUld never be known if the information were not produced. (An exanple of 
c:perational information is the development of some new technology that could 
be applied to a variety of manufacturing processes.) The second type of 
information is called trading information and pertains to knowledge about 
events that IIKlUld occur regardless of whether information were produced about 
them. (An exanple of trading information is knowledge of a firm's accounting 
figures.) The cr itical distinction between t.'1ese types of information is that 
c:perational information is valuable to firms since it enables them to make 
cperating decisions at least as good as those they could make in its absence. 
Trading information, however, is valueless to firms since it relates to 
decisions already made. It is now necessary to examine the costs and 
benefits, both individual and scx::ial, asscx::iated with the production and 
dissemination of these two types of information. 
Prior knowledge of trading or operational information about a firm is 
privately valuable (i.e., valuable to an individual). This private value 
arises from the ability of an informed investor to trade the ownership shares 
of firms about which he possesses nonpublic information; that is, he can trade 
shares at prices which fail to reflect their true value. Thus, each 
individual has an incentive to generate information until its marginal benefit 
(to him) equals its marginal cost. Furthermore, an informed individual also 
has an incentive to publicize his information, althOugh not before .he has made 
a specu~tive ccmni.tment. The crucial question now becomes, how does scx::iety 
benefit from the private production and dissemination of information? 
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First, consider trading information. Since this information has equal 
likelihood of being positive or negative, the expected change in the ~arket 
value of a firm's shares associated with positive expenditures on trading 
information is always zero. Therefore, the expected effect of disclosing such 
information is nothing more than a redistribution of wealth among investors. 
If the production of this information uses up real resources, then a situation 
has arisen which is not consistent with Pareto optimality. That is, there 
exist obtainable distributions of wealth which would make sane investors 
better off, while leaving none worse off. Pareto superior distributions could 
be reached if individuals refrained from allocating resources toward the 
generation of socially valueless trading information. Tb illustrate this 
point, suppose that rather than allowing for private generation of trading 
information, the entire community of investors could be simultaneously 
informed about sane bit of trading information. The question is how much 
would they pay as a group to receive this information? Since this information 
will have no inpact on the operation of firms, and will only serve to 
redistribute wealth aIOOI'lg investors, the answer is: nothing. 
Now consider the social implications of the private production of 
operational information. Here, the individual's incentive to disclose his 
information is now socially desirable since firms can utilize the information 
to improve their productive processes. That is, using the earlier 
illustration, the community would pay a positive amount to have the 
information disclosed simultaneously to all investors. Nevertheless, if costs 
are incurred in the production or dissemination of q;>erational information, 
the net benefits to society are not clearcut. 
Tb sum, both trading and operational information are privately valuable, 
and thus, incentives exist for their production and dissemination. Trading 
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information, however, has no social value since it does not contr iOOte to 
produCtion decisions. FUrthermore, if resources are expended to generate this 
knowledge, then there is a loss to society. ~rational information, on the 
other hand, is socially valuable; however, the gain from public disclosure 
rust be offset by any costs associated with the acquisition or dissemination 
process. These arguments illply that insider trading is, at best, a socially 
useless practice when trading information is involved. \'/hen operational 
information is considered, insider trading will be socially desirable only if 
the~production value of the information exceeds the costs associated with its 
generaton and disclosure. This analysis suggests that the proper approach to 
determining whether insider trading should be regulated is to examine costs 
rather than benefits. That is, are the costs to society less when insiders 
are permitted to trade freely or when their trading practices are regulated? 
Building upon the previous arguments, r-bran [36] examines the social costs 
when insider trading is regulated versus those when insider trading is 
unregulated. Considering the former case, it is assumed that the regulations 
remove the private value of information to insiders by preventing trading 
practices which would yield above average returns. Consequently, insiders no 
longer have an incentive to trade based upon their special knowledge. 
FUrthermore, their incentive to disclose information soon after its 
acquisition is also removed. (Recall that when insiders are permitted to 
trade freely, they have an incentive to reduce their investment risk by 
minimizing the time period they withhold information.) Since information now 
becanes public more slowly, securities are often mispriced by the market. 
Outsiders, realizing that publicly unknown information exists, have an 
incentive to produce or acquire this knowledge since it is privately valuable 
to them. Expenditures toward generating this information contribute nothing 
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to output and thus represent social waste. Hence, the regulation of insider 
trading leads to expenditures of real resources toward generating information 
which contributes nothing to output. 
Alternatively, consider the consequences when insider trading is 
unregulated. Here, contrary to the former case, information is privately 
valuable to insiders as well as outsiders. Since insiders are permitted to 
trade based upon their special knowledge, they have an incentive to produce 
information, establish speculative positions, and then publicly disclose their 
information. In order to reduce their investment risk, insiders shorten the 
period they withhold information; thus, securities are mispriced less 
frequently than when insider trading is regulated. Since insiders are capable 
of obtaining information before outsiders, they are able to "capture the 
change in market value asociated with any new inEtrmation regardless of the 
information produced by outsiders." (27) Consequently, outsiders no longer have 
the incentive to expend capital on the production of information which will 
not enable them to capture trading profits. Although insiders still have 
private incentives to acquire information, this acquisition is accomplished 
sinply through performing their corporate duties and thus, the costs involved 
are negligible. Consequently, since insiders can generate and disseminate 
information nore quickly and at a lower cost than outsiders, "hran concludes 
that there is less social waste associated with allowing insider trading than 
with regUlating the practice. 
Critics of the traditional view offer three primary arguments emphasizing 
the benefits fran insider trading. The first is that allowing insiders to 
trade freely provides a unique form of remmeration for corporate 
entrepreneurs thereby strengthening incentives for innovative activity within 
the firm. The secq'ld argument is that when insiders are permitted to base 
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trading decisions on their special knowledge, they have an incentive to 
rapidly disseminate this information. Consequently, market prices adjust more 
quickly when insiders trade than if they are forced to pursue more time 
consuming trading strategies or to abstain from trading all together. '!he 
third argument is that insider trading reduces incentives for outsiders to 
devote resources toward the production Or acquisition of information. This is 
because insiders can acquire and disseminate information more quickly and at a 
lower cost than outsiders. As a consequence, resources are no longer 
allocated toward t he socially suboptimal production of information. 
'!his chapter has presented two distinct views of insider trading. '!he 
traditional view asserts that insider trading is harmful to outsiders and 
should therefore be regulated. Contrary to this widely held belief, several 
alternative theories point out the potential benefits arising from this 
practice. Despite the critics' questioning of the current justification of 
insider trading regulations, policy decisions strongly embrace the traditional 
viewpoint. . '!he next chapter takes a look at existing regulations focusing on 
their intentions as well as the methods and difficulties associated with their 
enforcement. 
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CHAPl'ER 3 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the nature of federal 
insider trading laws. Emphasis will be placed on the intent and enforcement 
policies associated with the var ious regulations. In addition, an attenpt 
will also be made to point out certain shortcomings or enforcemnent 
difficulties which hinder the regulators in their efforts to prevent the abuse 
of nonpublic information. As stated earlier, federal legislation directed 
taNard insider trading is found in Section 16 of the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act and in RIle 10b-5 prorulgated in 1942. 
It was stated during the Congressional Hearings of 1933-1934 that Section 
16 was "aimed at the general evil of officers and directors rigging their 
stock up and down, and squeezing out their 0\'ll1 stockholder's. " (1) The specific 
type of activity to which this statement·refers is the famous (or, perhaps, 
infamous) stock pools of the 1920's and earlier. A stock pool consisted of a 
number of corporate executives and directors who met and exchanged valuable 
nonpublic market information. (2) 
One tactic enployed by these pools required that insiders intentionally 
time their purchases with the intent of causing a rise in price. This, in 
turn, would make a stock appear relatively strong thereby inducing further 
purchasing by outsiders. (3) .~ the price rose, t he members of the pool would 
sell their shares and thus realize a profit. 
A second tactic enployed by these pools was to release misleading 
statements to the market which would result in large fluctuations in a stock's 
price occuring during a relatively short time period. These statements were 
aimed primarily toward stock traders whose transactions were based upon 
technical factors (e.g., volume or price). (4) The misleading assertions made 
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by the pools were often that heavy-buying was going on in a cor9cration's 
shares. This induced speculators to purchase shares with the hope of 
profiting from some soon-to-be-announced good news. However, since the 
decision to release any information was ultimately left to the discretion of 
the insiders, a stock's price would often decline before any news beca~ 
public. Consequently, the only persons who could be expected to consistently 
profit from these price gyrations were the members of the stock pools. 
The consensus during the 1933-1934 Congressional Hearings was that stock 
pools and other similar practices engaged in by corporate insiders were 
fradulent and manipulatory and resulted in financial injuury to shareholders. 
In response to this widely held perception, the Section 16 legislation was 
promulgated with the intent oE preventing unfair trading practices on G,e part 
of insiders. 
Section 16 is composed of three parts: (a), (b), and (c).(5) 16 (a) 
formally defines an insider as any person who is directly or indirectly the 
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity security , 
or who is an officer or director of the issuer of such security. (6) 
Additionally, 16 (a) imposes two requirements on insiders. First, an insider 
is required to file with the SEC, at the time of the registration of his 
corporation's security or within ten days after he becomes a beneficial owner, 
officer, or director, a statement of the amount of all equity securities 
issued by his corporation of which he is the beneficial owner. The specific 
form on which this information is filed is the Form 3, ,formally referred to as 
the "Initial Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities." The second 
requirement made by l6(a) is that the insider must file a transaction report 
within ten days after the close of each calendar month in which there has been 
any change in his hOldings. This filing is made on Form 4, the "Statement of 
Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities. " 
3-3 
Once received by the SEC, the information contained in the Fbrm 3 and Form 
4 Statements is made available to the public. In fact, the transactions data 
contained on the Form 4' s (with the exception of options transactions) is 
published monthly by the SEC in the Official Summary of Security Transactions 
and Holdings. '!'his publicity is intended to encourage voluntary maintenance 
of proper fiduciary standards by those in control of corporations and, at the 
same time, give public investors information as to purchases and sales by 
insiders, which might, in turn, indicate their private opinion as to the 
prospects of the corrpany.(7) In addition, the listing of purchases and sales 
of securities in these reports is useful in determinig whether a violation of 
other Section 16 provisions has occurred. 
Section 16 (b) outlaws what are loosely referred to as 'short swing I 
transactions. Specifically, this rule requires that profits realized by an 
insider from any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of his corporation's 
equity securities within a period of less than six months shall be returned to 
.the corporation. (8) Liability under 16(b) is determined irrespective of the 
intentions of the insider entering into the transaction.. For instance, 
suppose an insider purchases his corporation's stock on January 1 based on his 
knowledge of an impending merger a~ouncement between his firm and another 
concern. If he sells his stock after July 1, he is not in violation of 
16 (b)--regardless of the size of his profits and the fact that his trade was 
based upon nonpublic information. On the other hand, if the insider sells his 
stock prior to July 1, then he is liable under 16(b); however, this liability 
merely implies that the insider must'give up his profits. The fact that he 
traded on inside information does not impose any further liabilities on him as 
far as 16 (b) is concerned. Although the penalty associated with a 16 (b) 
violation may seem somewhat unexacting, a second example illustrates why a 
stiffer penalty may be unjustified. 
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Suppose an insider purchases shares of his corporation's stock on January 
1 as part of an annual stock purchasing plan. a~viously, no resort is made to 
nonpublic information. Suppose that on April 1, this insider is in desperate 
need of cash and is thus forc? _ to to liquidate a substantial portion of his 
portfolio. '£his action triggers a l6(b) violation, and t he insider is forced 
to give up any profits realized from his purchase on January 1. In this case, 
it would seem unfair to subject the insider to futher penalties simply because 
he was in need of cash. 
Part (b) of Section 16 was enacted primarily in response to abuses in 
which insiders possessing material nonpublic information bought and sold their 
corporation's securities, "as the circumstances warrented, based upon their 
special knowledge. The legislation was also promulgated with the intent of 
rerroving incentives for insiders to engage in manipulatory activities (e.g., 
stock pools) designed to produce sudden changes in market prices in order to 
obtain short swing profits. 
Section l6(b) violations are detected by c~ipUter. Specifically, the SEC 
continually feeds transactions data from the Form 4 Statements into a computer 
which then determines, for each insider, whether at least six months have 
elapsed between any purchase and sale or sale and purchase. Although l6(b) 
apparently applies to options trading, it is suprising to note that no 
transactions data for options is fed into the computer. (9) Hence, if an 
insider's option transactions are scrutinized for l6(b) violations then the 
process is performed by hand. Given the scale of the task involved, this 
explanation seems unlikely. 
Finally, Section l6(c) prohibits insiders from engaging in short sales of 
their corporation's equity securities. (lO) The intent of this provision is to 
rerrove the incentive for corporate managers to purposely make poor decisions 
in order to profit from the ensuing decline in market prices. 
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At first glance, Section 16 appears to be an effective deterrent to 
insider trading abuses; however, three fundamental problems exist. First, 
these proscriptions apply only to registered insiders; i.e., those persons 
described in 16 (a) • In reality, the Section 16 definition of an insider 
covers only a subset of all persons who regularly come in contact with inside 
information. Certainly there may not exist any practical solution to this 
shortcoming; nevertheless, its existence suggests that investors will still 
risk financial injury resulting from the practices which Section 16 was 
designed to prevent. 
A second problem with this Section is that it applies solely to an 
insider's transactions in the securities issued by his corporation. No 
restrictions are placed on an insider's transactions in the securities of 
other corporations. 
Finally, the third shortcoming associated with Section 16 is that its 
provisions place no restricitons on an insider's ability to profit from a 
market position subsequent to the passage of the six month period described in 
l6(b). Conceivably, an insider could base his trading decisons on.nonpublic 
information and, in order. to conform to Section 16, simply wait six months 
before realizing his gains. The fact that the insider has an unfair advantage 
over outside investors when making his initial transaction would go 
unpunished. In this scenario, the only effect l6(b) has is to increase the 
insider's investment risk by requiring him to hold his position for at least 
six months. 
The existence of the problems just mentioned prorrpted the SEC to 
promulgate Rule lOb-5 in 1942. This proscription currently serves as the 
priwary statutory deterrent to the abuse of nonpublic information. Recall 
that Rule lOb-5 states in part: 
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It shall be unlawful for any ~erson, directly or indirectly, .•. to make 
any untrue stat~nent of a material fact or omit to state a material 
fact ... in connection 'tlith the purchase or sale of any security. (11) 
'!'his Rule is particularly significant for. two reasons. first, it 
exolicitly prohibits persons from engaging in security transactions on the 
basis of material information wi~~t prior disclosure of such information. 
(For this reason the proscri?ton is often referred to as the "disclose or 
abstain" rule . ) The second feature of Rule lOb-5 which war rents attention is 
that it applies not only to registered insiders as defined in Section 16 but 
to all persons. This effectively means that any person coming in contact with 
what he knows to be inside information is prohibited from utilizing this 
special knowledge for the purpose of making trading decisions until that 
knowledge has been publicly disclosed. 
'!'he primary intent of Rule lOb-5 is to promote informational equality 
between all buyers and sellers in securities markets. It is also devoted to 
assuring that information disseminated to the investing public is both 
complete and accurate. 
Given the ambitious nature of the prohibition, one is inrnediatley led to 
question the extent to which it can be effectively enforced. Specifically, 
one may ask, how do the regUlators intend to detect violations of Rule lOb-5? 
And further, once a possible violation has been detected, is there a 
reasonable chance of obtaining a conviction? 
In response to the first question, the sa::: as well as the self-regulated 
stock exchanges are committed to detecting security transactions based upon 
material, nonoublic information. '!he Stock Watch Department of the New York 
Stock Exchange has an elaborate COlIPllter system designed to detect unusual 
trading activity. The smaller exchanges and the sa::: also monitor markets with 
the aid of computers; however, their systems are much less sophisticated than 
the NYSE system. 
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Specifically, the Stock Watch system continually monitors the price and 
volwne rrovements of all NYSE traded stocks. These conputers are programned 
with an elaborate set of predetermined statistical boundaries which are 
violated when a stock's price rroves up or down at an unusually rapid pace or 
when a stock trades at an unusually high volume. The detection of trading 
patterns which penetrate these boundaries is not an unusual oc:currance; there 
are literally thousands of false alarms. (12) Nevertheless, the Stock Watch 
Deparbcent attempts to investigate all such transactions by following a 
procedure designed t o eliminate trades which are not based on inside 
information. when an unusual price or volwne movement is detected in the 
stock of some corporation, an irrmediate check is made to determine whether any 
news was released regarding that firm. If this is not the case, then the 
company is contacted directly and asked to provide a possible explanation for 
the unusual trading activity in its stock. finally, if the company is unable 
to provide any answers, brokers are contacted and an effort is made to learn 
the identities of the persons or institutions that have traded in the stock. 
Furthermore, an attempt is made to determine whether these traders are linked 
in any way to company insiders. When it becomes evident that th!,! market 
flurries were a conseguence of trading based on inside information, the Stock 
Watch Deparb~nt notifies the SEC which then joins in the investigation. This 
occurs because the SEC has the power to bring charges against anyone violating 
feder al insider tradi ng laws , whereas the self-regulated exchanges have 
jurisdiction only over their member firms. (13) 
The role played by the SEC in detecting trading on inside information is 
relatively limited. In addition to a small conputer system which is capable 
of tracking a couple hundred stocks, the SEC examines the transaction reports 
(Form 4' s) submitted by registered insiders. the specific procedure followed 
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involves an ~ ~ examination of Form 4 Statements in relation to a specific 
news event which causes a revaluation of the market price of one or more 
stocks. For instance, suppose a proposed merger between the tWQ corporations 
ABC and XYZ is announced during the month of '>lay. As a result of this 
announcement there is a significant appreciation in the price of both firms' 
equity securities. The SEC responds to this event by examining all Form 4 
Statements submitted by insiders of ABC and XYZ during the months leading up 
to the announcement., (The actual number of months examined may vary depending 
upon the importance of the news event in question.) If any large purchases 
were made by insiders of ei~,er firm during the months just prior to the 
announcement, then the SEC may charge the insider(s) involved with a 10b-5 
violation. Whe~,er or not these charges are filed depends upon whether the 
SEC feels its case would hold up in court. This, in turn, depends upon the 
volume of the transactions as well as their timing in relation to the 
announcement date. 
There are several impediments to these detection procedures followed by 
the exchanges and the SEC. As one might expect, the SEl: detects r,elatively 
few 10b-5 violations. This is due to the limited capability of its computer 
system and to the fact that few insiders are foolish enough to commit an 
-
obvious 10b-5 violation and then register the trade with the SEl:. 
The Stock Watch Department which is credited with the majority of 
detections also faces a number of problems. For instance, a person trading on 
inside information can easily avoid detection by keeping the volume of his 
trade in line with normal volume patterns. This tactic takes advantage of the 
fact that the exchange computers are programmed to detect only relatively 
large volume trades or those transactions having a marked effect on a 
security's price. 
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Another strategy which has consistently befuddled investigators involves 
executing trades through a Swiss Bank account in order to conceal one's 
identity. Since neither the SEC nor the JustiCE Department has jurisdict ion 
over foreign institutions, they are .prevented from determining the identities 
of customers on whose part these institutions are acting. (14) This is true 
even if the customers are U.S. citizens. Thus, according to one source, 
"Someone with a Swiss bank account and access to inside information can 
usually run roughshod through the financial markets, with little likelihood of 
being caught." (15) 
Finally, the strategy which many perceive to be the most widely used and 
potentially least risky from a legal standpoint is for insiders to trade 
through third parties. For instance, an insider of XYZ Corporation possessing 
inside knowledge of an impending merger between XYZ and ABC can contact his 
brother-in-law and instruct him to purchase several hundred shares of XYZ 
steck on the day preceding the announcement, and to sell those shares 
immediately following the adjustment in price. This strategy is extremely 
effective for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that the trade will be 
detected since the volume consists of only several hundred shares. (16) And 
second, even if the transaction is disccvered, there is little likelihood of 
establishing proof that the trader possessed inside information and based his 
trading decision upon such knowledge. 
Now that the precedures and problems associated with detecting lOb-5 
violations have been examined, it is necessary to consider what transpires 
after a possible violation is detected. Recall the question posed earlier: 
"Q1ce a possible violation has been detected, is there a reasonable chance of 
obtaining a conviction?" Based upon the SEC's record to date, the answer to 
this question is erost certainly no. Although the maxi.mJm penalty for a 
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criminal conviction under Rule 10b-5 is five years in jail and a ~lO,OOO fine, 
the Justice Deparb~nt has secured only five convictions since 1~42. (17) The 
reasons underlying this paucity of convictions shall now be discussed. 
Tb successfully convict a person on criminal charges of violating Rule 
10b-5 through trading on inside information, it must be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt that the person knowingly failed to disclose material facts 
prior to making his trade. (18) Proving this usually requires drawing a link 
between the accused and an insider of the coopany whose securities that person 
traded. But even in cases where there exists an apparent link between trader 
and insider there remain problems of prcof. States one SEC surveillance 
official, 
We look into two or three unusual run-ups a week, and more than half the 
time we can trace the activity to people who might have been in a position 
to have inside information. But proving they had the information, and 
acted because of it, is usually impossible. These people always have a 
plausible story, and we can't disprove it without getting into their 
heads. 
Due to the overwhelming difficulties associated with criminal prosecution, 
the SEC has been inclined to settle. all but the most egregious violations 
through civil suits. The maximum penalty the SEC can win through such suits 
is 'disgorgement' (the repayment of trading profits), and an injuoction 
against further violations. (20) In signing this injunction, which is known as 
a 'consent decree,' the accused neither admits nor denys guilt but agrees 
never to commit a violation in the future. Once the defendent agrees to this 
type of settlement, the agency is usually willing to drop the case to avoid a 
costly tr ial. 
It is fairly obvious that the civil penalties for trading on inside 
information are lenient relative to the corresponding criminal penalties. 
FUrthermore, the fact that civil suits are standard procedure for all but the 
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IlDst egregious violations has led many to question the deterrent effect of the 
SEC's enforcement efforts. (21) Aware of this criticism, the SeC has begun 
urging Congress to raise the civil penalties for trading on inside 
information. Under the proposed legislaton, insiders would be liable for 
their profits, plus a civil penalty of as much as three times that arnount.(22 ) 
This chapter has presented an examination of the current federal insider 
trading regulations--specifically, those comprising Section 16 of the 1934 SEA 
and Rule 10b-5. Although the Section 16 proscriptions appear relatively 
straightforward, several shortcomings are evident. In particular, Section 16 
applies only to trades by registered insiders · in the securities of their 
corporation; further, it fails to explicitly prohibit trading on inside 
information. 'fbese oversights provided partial impetus for the promulgation 
of Rule lOb-5 in 1942, which requires all persons to truthfully disclose all 
material information in connection with a securities transaction or to abstain 
from engaging in that transaction. The purpose of this regulation is to 
prOl1Dte fairness in securities markets through rellDving the informational 
advantages possessed by insiders. Unfortunately, the a~itious nature of this 
regUlation has led to recurring difficulties in detecting and successfully 
prosecuting offenders. FurtherllDre, the effective penalty for violating this 
rule (i.e., the civil penalty) has been described as little IlDre than a "slap 
on the wrist."(23) Consequently, the effectiveness of the SEC's enforcement 
efforts in both identifying and detering violations of insider trading laws 
has been drawn into question. 
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CHAPl'ER 4 
Although a great deal of literature has been published regarding the 
subject of insider trading, the range of these studies has been rather narrow. 
The vast majority of articles have either involved deductive arguments 
concerning the desirability of the practice or enpirical examinations of the 
excess returns which accrue to insiders as a result of their trading 
activities. These studies have seldom dealt specifically with the subject of 
insider trading regulations; however, the findings of IlOSt enpirical works do 
have inplications regarding regulatory effectiveness. 
The bulk of past enpirical studies has been concerned, in one way or 
another, with determining whether and/or in relation to what events do excess 
returns accrue to insiders from their trading in the stock market. Given that 
trading based on inside information is illegal, these studies have indirect 
implications regarding the effectiveness of the SEC's policing of ~nsider 
activity. The findings of several studies which are representative of the 
type of work that has been done in this area during the past fifteen years 
will be examined in this chapter. 
In 1968 Lorie and Niederhoffer [27J published a paper in which they 
determined, contrary to the conclusion of almost all previous studies, that 
''proper and prOllpt analysis of data on insider trading can be profitable. " (1) 
Their study involved three separate analyses of insider trading data. 
The first question they asked was whether insiders generally bought shares 
of stock prior to good news. 'lb answer this they examined, in three ways, 
insider transactions before large changes in a stock's price. First, by 
examining the last insider transaction occurring before the large price change 
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they observed that the odds favoring a large positive change were 2.5:1 after 
a purchase and 1.1:1 after a sale. Second, their analysis of the net 
purchases (total purchases minus total sales) during the six months prior to 
the large price change yielded odds of 2.2:1 favoring an increase in prices 
when the net number of purchases was positive. Third, by examining net shares 
purchased (total shares purchased minus total shares sold) in the six months 
leading up to the large price IlDVement they still found evidence (though less 
significant than in the previous two cases) that insiders demonstrated skill 
in forcasting large price changes. 
The second test perforrred by L&N was concerned wi th determining the 
significance of the relationship between intensive insider trading and 
subsequent price IlDVements in stock prices. Tb gain further information 
regarding the possibility for outsiders to profitably utilize insider trading 
data, percentage changes in price were cOll'Puted over a six month period 
beginning with the date on which the insiders' transactions were made public. 
The results indicated a strong relationship between insider trading and 
subsequent price movements. During months when the number of inside buyers 
exceeded the number of inside sellers by at least two, the probability was 
about .60 that the stock would outperform the IllIA during the six months 
following the disclosure date. Conversely, when the number of sellers 
exceeded the number of buyers by at least two, the probability was about .64 
that the stock would perform worse than the IllIA during the six month period 
subsequent to disclosure. 
As their t hird test , L&N attellpted, unsuccessfully, to determine whether 
there existed companies in which the insiders were consistently more 
suocessful in predicting price IlDVements than were insiders in general. Based 
on the results of their study, L&N proposed that the "SEX:: and the stock 
exchange should be encouraged to provide faster and more complete 
dissemination of insider trading data" to promote greater informational 
efficiency in the stock market. (2) 
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A 1974 study by Jeffery Jaffe [19] attenpted to ' inprove upon the 
methodological techniques used in previous studies and to resolve the 
conflicting opinions regarding the profitability of insider trading. His 
results took into account transactions costs, the relative risk (volatility) 
of different securities, and general market conditions. In response to Lorie 
and Niederhoffer's conclusions regarding the profitability of basing one's 
trading decisions on insider trading data, Jaffe also examined the information 
content of the Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings. His 
results were based upon the computed abnormal returns on securities subsequent 
to specific types of insider trading activity. The findings indicated that 
insiders did possess valuable information; furthermore, much of the 
information contained in these trades remained undiscounted by the date of 
their publication in the Official Summary. When transactions costs were 
considered, however, the majority of the holding period returns OOlI'pUted 
earlier could no longer be considered statistically large. In his concluding 
remarks, Jaffe professed that "the results indicating that trading on inside 
information is widespread suggest that insiders actually do violate security 
regulations ... (3) 
In 1976 Joseph E. Finnerty [131 published his study "Insiders and Market 
Efficiency" in which he tested the strong-form of the efficient market 
hypothesis. The strong-form assumes that all currently known information is 
fully reflected in pries; in other words, no individual can have above average 
expected returns because of monopolistic access to information. (4) He noted 
that the results of previous studies had served as sufficient tests of the 
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semi-strong form (i. e., all publicly available information being reflected in 
prices) but were unacceptable for testing the strong-form. The reason being 
that the sanples used in the earlier works were selected on the basis of a 
great preponderance of insider trades in a single direction, thus the computed 
returns were larger than those expected for the "average" insider. To rellDVe 
this bias, Finnerty tested the performance of the entire population of 
insiders who register their trades with the SEC. Not suprisingly, his results 
indicated that insiders were able to outperform the market by identifying both 
positive and negative situations within their corporation. This finding was 
incongruous with the assumptions made by the strong-form of the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
Further research investigating the profitability of insider trading was 
presented in a 1979 study by Baesel and Stein [3]. Their work paralleled that 
of Jaffe and Finnerty with three modifications. First, the analysis in this 
work was performed using data from stocks on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). 
Second, B&S conpared the returns associated with the trading activity of two 
subgroups of insiders: bank directors and ordinary insiders. Finally, a 
randomly drawn control sanple was included for purpose of coaparison with the 
performance of insiders. The analysis yielded three important results. 
First, both bank directors and ordinary insiders earned excess returns 
relative to an uninformed trading strategy (the control sample). This result 
was not in keeping with the strong-form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Second, the premiums earned by the group of bank directors was significantly 
larger than those earned by ordinary insiders. Finally, the results were 
inconsistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis 
since the premiums did not accrue to the insiders until several months after 
the simulated trade--subsequent to the normal period before insider 
transactions data was released to the public. 
4-5 
The final three pieces reviewed are directed lIDre toward examining the 
SEC's effectiveness in policing the market for insider trading abuses. The 
first is a 1974 article by Jeffery Jaffe [20J entitled "The Effect of 
Regulation OJanges on Insider Trading." Given the results of previous studies 
which determined that insiders do possess valuable market information, Jaffe 
set out to conpare the extent of their use of that information during time 
per iods imnediately before and after iIrportant regulatory events. The three 
events chosen were (1) the Cady, Boberts decision (1961), (2) the Texas Gulf 
Sulfur indictment (1965), and (3) the Texas Gulf Sulfur decision (1966). (See 
Appendices 2 and 3 for descriptions of these events.) In particular, the study 
examined profitability and volume changes in insider trading immediately 
following these events. 
The findings indicated that the changes in the average profitability of 
insider trades after the case law events were not significantly different from 
the average profitability before the events. FurtherllDre, Jaffe's use of 
lIDnthly as well as daily market volume figures did not indicate that the 
regulatory events had any effect on the magnitude of insider trading. 
Finally, there was no evidence suggesting that the three events had any 
cumulative effect on the profitability of insider trading. Jaffe concluded 
that his results "do not suggest that the recent regulation of insiders is 
effective, casting doubt on the value of this regulation to society." (5) 
Keown and Pinkerton [22], in their 1981 study, approached the question of 
regulatory effectiveness from a different angle. Their concern was with the 
possib.le leakage of unannounced takeover plans, due to insider trading, on 
daily stock price lIDVementS in advance of the planned takeover announcements. 
Unlike lIDst previous studies of insider trading, this one drew its data from 
Standard and Poor's Leily Stock Price Record. It was pointed out that since 
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nearly all earlier studies obtained their data from the SEC's Official 
Summary, the observations and conclusions of these studies applied only to 
registered insiders. K&P held the opinion that a thorough analysis of 
regulatory effectiveness RUst not ignore undisclosed trades based on inside 
information (i.e., illegal insider trading). Therefore, their test involved 
an examination of daily holding period returns for the stocks of 194 
successfully acquired firms on 157 trading days surrounding the announcement 
date. 
The findings indicated significant increases in volume occurring as early 
as three weeks prior to announcement. It was noted, however, that these rises 
in volume were not a result of trading by registered insiders. According to 
K&P, the dramatic increases in volume in conjunction with the absence of 
trading by registered insiders suggested that insiders may have frequently 
traded through third parties to avoid detection. 
Concerning abnormal price movements, the results suggested the existence 
of substantial trading based on the unreleased takeover plans beginning 
approximately one month prior to the announcement date. During the final five 
to eleven days inrne<'liately preceding the announcement, there was "uncontrolled 
abuse of RIle lOb-5. n (6) K&P observed that approximately half of the total 
price movement attributed to the merger information occurred prior to the 
announcement date. The remaining market reaction occurred on the day of 
disclosure with a IlUCh smaller price movement occurring the following day. 
This apparent lag in adjustment was attributed to the fact that some 
announcements were made subsequent to the market's close; hence, K&P's 
findings supported the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
The conclusion was made that "inpending merger announcements are poorly held 
secrets, and trading on this nonpublic information abounds. " (7) 
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The !lOst recent paper dealing with insider trading is Perman's [38J 
"Insider Trading and the Dis"semination of Firms Forcast Information." The 
pur9Qse of this work was to establish whether a link exists between insider 
trading and information dissemination. Given that RJ.le lOb-5 prohibits 
insider trading on the basis of nonpublic information, this study could also 
be seen as a test of the current effectiveness of the SEC's enforcement 
policies. Unlike the previous study by Keown and Pinkerton, Perman's 
transactions data included only registered trades (i.e., those contained in 
the Official Summary). The analysis was performed in two stages. First, 
there was an examination of the association between the timing of insiders' 
trades and subsequent earnings forcasts. Secooo, measures were made of the 
abnormal returns to insiders as a result of their trading activity prior to 
these disclosures. 
To determine whether insiders timed their trades relative to earnings 
forcast announcements, Perman first computed average daily abnormal security 
returns for a sample of 550 iooividual firms during periods of time before and 
after announcements of corporate earnings forcasts. These abnormal returns 
represented estimates of the returns one would capture from basing trading 
decisions on the forcast information. Next, he pooled this data and computed 
the 'on average' abnormal return one would receive from trading on any given 
day surrounding a typical earnings forcast announcement. Also, for individual 
firms the magnitude of the daily abnormal returns was examined for the three 
day period leading up to and including the announcement date. Penman then 
ranked these firms based on the size of their returns: firms at the top had 
the highest abnormal returns while firms at I::l .e bottom had the lowest. This 
list of firms was then grouped into twenty nonoverlapping portfolios. If 
insiders timed their trades relative to the forcast announcements, one would 
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expect to see an abundance of insider purchases (positive net purchases) prior 
to announcement in the high ranking portfolios and an abundance of sales 
(negative net purchases) prior to announcement in the low ranking portfolios. 
Within each protfolio, insider trading activity was examined during a nine 
month period surrounding each earnings forcast announcement. This period 
consisted of the month in which the announcement was made (IOOnth 0) and the 
four lOOI'lths preceding (-1 to -4) and following (1 to 4) this lOOI'lth. For each 
of these months, the net nuntJer of insider purchases (purchases minus sales) 
was computed for each firm; this number was then averaged over all firms 
contained in each portfolio to obtain the mean net purchases per lOOI'lth. For 
each portfolio, Penman coopared the mean net purchases during a given period 
prior to the announcement with the mean net purchases in the corresponding 
period subsequent to the announcement. For instance, associated with a 
forcast announcement resulting in an upward revaluation of a firm's stock, one 
might expect to see a larger number of net purchases in lOOnth -1 than in lOOnth 
1. 
Penman found that in 15 of the 20 portfolios, mean net purchases in lOOnth 
o before the forcast date relative to those in lOOnth 0 after the forcast date 
were in the direction predicted by the sign of the mean abnormal return. 
FurtherlOOre, of the five exceptions, only one fell in the top six or bottom 
six portfolios where one would expect the pattern to be the strongest. After 
repeating this analysis for the other four IOOnths, Penman noted that "while 
purchases and sales with respect to good news forcasts appear to take place 
close to the forcast date, trading with respect to bad news is only evident 
two lOOnths out from the forcast lOOnth." (8) 
Penman's findings indicated that corporate insiders do time their trades 
in relation to upcoming earnings forcasts in order to capture the value of the 
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inforllation contained in those announcerrents; and that there exist significant 
abnorllal returns associated with trading inforllation. 
Insiders apparently respond to the incentive to take market positions on 
the basis of infor!lation they publicly announce. The disincentives of a 
potential SEC investigation are not sufficient to eliminate this 
incentive •••• (9) 
The implications of the studies just reviewed can be sUlllllarized as 
follows. Corporate insiders can and do execute profitable trades based upon 
the valuable infor!lation which they possess. Sate of these trades are made 
directly and disclosed to the SEC while others are llade indirectly through 
third parties or through other rrethods; all, however, are in violation of Rule 
10b-5. 
The apparent ineffectiveness of current enforcerrent policies can be 
attributed to a number of factors. Figuring prominently among these are the 
high costs of enforcerrent and the difficulties in proving that given behavior 
constitutes a violation. The existence of such limitations has dictated a 
selection policy which giyes priority to cases in which there exists 
significant evidence of wrongdoing. In other 'h':Jrds, only the most egregious 
violations ever risk detection or investigaton. This reasoning is supported 
by the findings of the studies just examined. 
First, recall that the results of Keown and Pinkerton's analysis suggest 
that the SEC is successful in reducing the incentives for insiders to trade on 
nonpublic inforllation of llajor significance, particularly rrerger or takeover 
announcerrents • 
••• 76 percent of the firms studied experienced no open !larket purchases or 
sales by registered insiders during the month prior to the announcement 
date. Further, only 12 percent of the sarrple firms had positive net open 
llarket purchases during the month prior to the announcerrent date. (10) 
Pen!lan'S findings, en the other hand, indicate that where events of 
non-major significance are concerned--in this case, announcements of annual 
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earnings forcasts--the incentive for insiders to trade based on this 
information is not significantly diminished by the possibility of an SEC 
investigation. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the SEC has developed a set of 
priorities regarding the current direction of its enforcement activities. 
Indeed, the head of the SEC's disclosure policy office has stated, "The abuse 
the agency is trying to curb is very flagrant." (11) These priorities have 
arisen due to enforcement difficulties associated with insider trading 
regulations. Thus, 
The investigators are forced to concentrate on cases in which the offence 
seems particularly gross, or in which the offenders are immediately 
obvious, or in which there are plenty of good clues, or in which they have 
been tiJ;Ped off. (12) 
This policy allows for roost trades by registered insiders to go unchecked, 
thus providing incentives for violating Rule 10b-5. In particular, one might 
expect to find a preponderance of 10b-5 violations associated with events 
which result in relatively small revaluations in security prices-for instance 
earnings or earnings forcast announcements as opposed to merger or takeover 
announcements. For reasons which will be pointed out in Chapter 6, this study 
will examine insider transactions associated with earnings announcements. 
First, however, given what has been learned about the nature and enforcement 
of insider trading regulations thus far, it is necessary to assess the 
possibilities for an insider to profitably trade based upon his special 
information with little risk from both a legal and financial standpoint. 
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CHAPl'ER 5 
The pr irna facie case for regulation of insider trading is based upon the 
perceived harm, both individual and social, arising from this practice. 
Assuming the perceived harm exists, then successful elimination of the basic 
informational inequalities between corporate insiders and public investors 
requires that two conditions be satisfied. First, regulations !lUst be 
accurate in the sense that they rust prevent all types of insider trading 
activity which would be considered harmful. Second, the restrictions !lUst be 
enforced to the point where the marginal enforcement costs are no greater than 
the marginal loss from IlOre insider trading. 
It is the thesis of this paper that the current regulations of insider 
trading are neither accurately stated nor adequatley enforced, thus enabling 
insiders to earn excess returns as a result of their informational advantage 
while subjecting themselves to negligible amounts of legal and downside risk. 
Legal risk shall be defined as the probability that a violation is detected by 
the regulators and criminal charges filed, and downside risk as the 
probability that the actual return on a market position will be negative. 
Insiders can obtain excess returns through utilizing trading strategies which 
involve a violation of the full disclosure requirement of RIle lOb-5 and the 
circumvention of various provisions of Section 16 of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange kt. 
Based upon the findings of the previous two chapters, this portion of the 
paper will present several trading guidelines which enable insiders to 
significantly reduce the amount of legal risk associated with a violation of 
RIle lOb-5. Additionally, three trading strategies will be described which 
5-1 
5-2 
allow for major reductions in downside risk through circumventing Section 
16(b): the short swing rule. Use of one of these trading strategies in 
conjunction with the aforementioned guidelines represents a powerful device 
for skirting the federal insider trading laws. I t should be noted that the 
trading techniques described in this study apply only to registered insiders 
trading aboveboard, i.e., those who disclose their transactions to the SEX:. 
A set of guidelines for reducing the legal risk associated with insider 
transactions !lUst be based upon the enforcement tactics currently ellployed by 
the regulators. Recall from Chapter 3 that the SEX: examines the timing and 
volume of trades by registered insiders prior to public disclosure of 
pertinent information. The greater the consequence of the information in 
terms of price revaluation, the closer the SEX: scruitinizes the pre-disclosure 
trades. As a further deterrent, the Stock Watch Department of the New York 
Stock Exchange follows, throughout the trading day, the price and volume 
JlDVements of all 'big board' stocks. The aIIIJUI1t of legal risk associated with 
a given insider transaction can thus be defined as a function of (1) the depth 
of the market for the insider's corporation's securities; (2) the volume of 
the insider's trade relative to normal volume patterns; (3) the timing of the 
trade relative to the date on which information is publicly disclosed; and (4) 
the iIIportance of the information upon which the trade is based. 
Market depth is defined as the existence of a large number of buyers and 
sellers. Ceteris paribus, the market depth for a given security is inversely 
related to the price elasticity of demand for that security. On the other 
hand, the volume of a transaction in a certain stock is directly related to 
the effect of that transaction on the stock's price. Thus, an insider runs a 
greater risk of having his trades spotted by the Stock watch computers if he 
is ~ading in a shallow market or in large quantity. 
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'!be timing of t rades merits consideration since the shorter the period of 
time between the insider's trade and the subsequent date of disclosure, the 
greater the likelihood of an SEC investigation. Finally, an insider is more 
likely to come under investigation if his trades are based on information of 
major significance than if his trades are based on less significant events. 
Consequently, an insider wishing to trade based on his knowledge of nonpublic 
information may reduce his legal risk by loosely adhering to a set of 
guidelines based upon current regulatory enforcement tactics. '!bese 
guidelines can be stated as follows (in descending order of importance). 
1. Trade on information of lesser significance. 
2. Trade well in advance of the date on which relevant information is 
made public. · 
3. Keep trading volume relatively low or trade in relatively deep 
markets. 
Due to their interdependent nature, it is possible for an insider to ignore 
one or more of these guidelines and still maintain a low level of legal risk. 
'!be conditions just presented enable the inside trader to reduce the legal 
risk associated with a violation of &lie lOb-5. However, the desirability of 
a given amount of legal risk can only be assessed through consideration of the 
relative amount of downside risk. '!be existence of this tradeoff necessitates 
an examination of downside risk from the perspective of corporate insiders. 
~ better understand downside risk, imagine a sucurities market in which 
insiders are permitted to trade freely. In this scenario no legal risk 
exists, and therefore, insiders attempt to minimize downside risk. '!bis can 
be accomplished, in part, through trading on information of major significance 
and trading in large quantity. Assuming the insider has correctly predicted 
the market's reaction to his information, there seems to be little chance that 
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his trade could be unprofitable. However, all transactions involve some 
amount of investment risk; i.e., there is always some probability that the 
actual return on a market position will diverge from the expected return. As 
long as there exists some amount of investment risk, the possibility of a 
negative return remains. Nevertheless, investment risk can be reduced, 
ceteris paribus, by decreasing the length of the holding period. Thus, in the 
unregulated market, the insider can minimize his downside risk by holding his 
market position for a length of time no longer than the period required for 
the information to be fully incorporated in price. For instance, if the 
insider possesses positive, nonpublic information he will disclose the 
information Unmediately after he has purchased ·shares of his corporation's 
stock and proceed to sell those shares as soon as the information released has 
been illpOUnded in the stock's price. This scheme will minimize the insider's 
vulnerability to price fluctuations not related to the information that was 
released. Therefore, when insiders are permitted to trade freely, two tactics 
can be employed to minimize downside risk: (1) trade on information of major 
consequence; and (2) minimize the holdiDJ period. 
with the regulation that exists in today's securities markets, adherance 
to these two guidelines will result in egregious violations of federal insider 
trading proscriptions. Both tactics serve to increase the amount of legal 
risk associated with 10b-5 violations; furthermore, the second tactic is also 
a violation of Section 16(b) which prohibits short swing transactions. It has 
previously been shown that Rule 10b-5 is not effectively enforced, but that 
violations of Section 16(b) are easily detected. Therefore, unless ·an insider 
can find a loophole in 16(b), he will be unable to reduce his downside risk 
without similarly increasing his legal risk. A closer examination of this 
rule is in order. 
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Section 16 (b) of the 1934 SPA reads, in part, as follows: 
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have 
been obtained by [an officer, director or principal stockholder] by reason 
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any 
purchase and sale, or and sale and purchase, of any equity security of 
such issuer ••• wi thin any per iod of less than six months •• . !:hall inure to 
and be recoverable by the issuer •••• (1) 
Recall that for a regulation to successfully achieve its desired purpose, it 
RUst be both effectively enforced and accurately stated. As was seen in 
Cllapter 3, 16(b) violations by registered insiders are detected by computer; 
thus an attenpt .at violating this provision would likely be unsuccessful. 
Though this rule appears to be effectively enforced, it is deficient in the 
sense that it fails to prohibit the use of trading strategies which would be 
considered violations of its original intent. That is, the opportunity exists 
for insiders to follow trading scherres which remain faithful to the language 
but not the purpose of Section 16 (b) • 
Recall that for the downside risk of a position to be eliminated, it is 'at 
least necessary to remove all investment risk; and the most obvious way to 
remove investment risk is to close out that position, i.e., sell and realize 
the current gain (or loss). Theoretically, one could also remove all 
investment risk by 'locking in' (defering) a current gain until sometime in 
the future. In reality, no such investment instrurrent exists which would 
enable an investor to do this. Nevertheless, through utilizing an option 
writing strategy, an investor can defer a current gain to a future date with 
an almost total reduction in investrrent risk and a proportional decrease in 
downside risk. (2) Suprisingly, Section 16 contains no proscriptions regarding 
this type of trading behavior, and thus, it appears that the short swing rule 
can be circumvented. 
Three trading scherres for use by registered insiders will now be 
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presented . Each makes use of stock option strategies to skirt Section 16 (b) 
and thereby reduce the insider's anount of downside risk. Since there is no 
explicit violation of 16(b) , use of these strategies will not increase legal 
risk. The first two schemes are designed to take advantage of positive inside 
information, while the third enables the insider to circumvent Section 16(c) 
by profiting from negative information. 
The first strategy allows the insider to lock in an unrealized stock gain 
by writing an in-the-llOney call option on that stock. (The term 'lock in' 
will be used even though there remains some amount of investment risk.) This 
strategy is not a violation of Section 16(b) since both positions (the stock 
and the call) are held for at least six nonths. The initial position (the 
purchase of stock) takes place sometime after the insider acquires knowledge 
of the positive, nsnpublic information. The insider can reduce his downside 
risk by making this pruchase closer to the announcement date; however, the 
resulting rise in legal risk must be mitigated through one of the other three 
factors (significance of information, trading volume, or market depth). On 
the date of public disclosure, the stock's price will immediately rise to 
reflect this new information. Ideally the insider would sell at this time in 
order to minimize his downside riSk; however, to avoid a 16(b) violation he 
wr i tes an in-the""l1X>l1ey call option on the shares of stock he purchased prior 
to the announcement. Typically, there will be several in-the""\OOl'ley calls from 
which to choose. A call which is more deeply in-the""l1X>l1eY will lead to a 
greater reduction in investment risk by more effectively locking in the 
unrealized gain. This implies diminished downside risk as well as upside 
potential. On the other hand, writing a call which is not so deeply 
in-the""l1X>l1eY will allow for further upside gains though the downside risk is 
also increased. 
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Once the strike price has been chosen, the expiration date must be decided 
upon. To avoid a 16(b) violation, the option !lUst expire no sooner than six 
IIDnths after it is written. Depending upon what date the insider wishes to 
write the call, he may have a choice between the intermediate and long term 
contracts or be forced to write the long term option. It is highly unlikely 
that the date signifying the end of the six month period will coincide with 
the expiration date. Thus after the six IIDnth period has elapsed, the insider 
may close out both positions by selling the stock and repurchasing the call. 
Alternatively, both positions can be held until the option expires. If the 
latter plan is chosen and the call is in-thellOney on the date of expiration,. 
then the call will automatically be exercised, i.e., the insider will be 
required to sell his shares. On the other hand, if the option is 
out-of-thellOney (i.e., the strike price exceeds the stock price) on the 
expiration date, then the call will expire worthless and the insider may 
choose between keeping or selling his shares. 
One question which may ar ise regarding this strategy is whether an insider 
would be held in violation of 16(b) in the unlikely event that the call option 
is exercised prior to the passage of the six IIDnth period, forcing him to sell 
his shares. The answer is no. According to Rule 16b-3, insiders are exempted 
from Section 16(b) in the case that they make delivery of shares of stock as 
payment for the exercise of an option. This is a result of the SEX:: I S long 
held "view that transactions such as these do not readily lend themselves to 
the abuse of inside information and should not automatically be subject to the 
recovery provisions of Section 16 (b) • n (3) Ironically, the insider would 
actually benefit from exercise prior to the expiration date. A second 
explanation of Strategy 1 can be illustrated by the following example. 
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A is on the board of directors of XYZ Corporation. On Apr il 5, 1980 A 
learns that the first quarter profits for XYZ rose to record levels, far 
exceeding analysts' predictions. Realizing that XYZ is currently undervalued 
by the market, A decides to make a stock purchase in advance of the inpending 
increase in its price. On April 6 A purchases sao shares of XYZ comron at $50 
per share; his initial investment is $25,000. XYZ releases its quarterly 
earnings report on April 14, and the price of XYZ stock jUIlps to $55 per 
share. A decides that the earnings news has been conpletely incorporated into 
the stock's price and wishes to lock in his unrealized profit of $5 per share. 
On April 15 A writes the XYZ O:tober 45 calls currently selling for $14 ($10 
of intrinsic value plus $4 of time value premium). For this he receives 
$7000. On O:tober 21, 1980 (over six months later) A's call option expires. 
If on that day XYZ stock is selling for more than $45 per share, the option 
will automatically be exercised and A's 500 shares of XYZ stock will be called 
away at $45 per share. Alternatively, if XYZ is selling for $45 per share or 
less, then the calls will expire worthless and A will sell the stock at the 
prevailing market price. (It is assumed for the purpose of this illustration 
that A has no desire to hold the stock once the expiration date has passed.) 
Table 1 shows the profitability of this strategy given various prices for XYZ 
stock on the date of expiration. The corresponding profit graph is depicted 
in Figure l. 
The table reveals that A's position will remain profitable if XYZ stock 
sells for above $36 per share on the expiration date. The maximum profit of 
$9 per share (a total gain of $4,500) will be realized if XYZ stock is selling 
at or above $45. ' In a cash account, this trading technique would require an 
investment of $18,000 ($25,000 - $7,000). The write has a maximum profit 
potential of $4500. The potential return from this position can be 
Table 1 
Profit Table for Insider Trading Strategy 1 
PRICES CN EXPIRATICN MTE 
STOCK CALL TOl'AL 
XYZ XYZ OCT STOCK SOLD PK)FIT PIVFIT PK)FIT 
STOCK 45 CALL (CALLED) AT PER SHARE PER SHARE PER SHARE 
30 0 30 -20 14 -6 
35 0 35 -15 14 -1 
36 0 36 -14 14 0 
40 0 40 -10 14 4 
45 0 45 -5 14 9 
50 5 (45) - 5 14 9 
55 10 (45) -5 14 9 
60 15 (45) -5 14 9 
65 20 (45) -5 14 9 
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approximated as $4,500/$18,000, a 25 percent gain for the period during which 
the position was held (aboot 6 1/2 months). If the write were done in a 
margin account, the return would be considerably higher. Note that dividends 
paid by the underlying stock and commission charge have been ignored. 
The second strategy involves writing an in-the-money put prior to the 
release of important information and subsequently writing an in-the-mcney 
covered call. This strategy implicitly assumes that the insider already owns 
enough shares in his corporation I s stock to Cover the call. This call rust be 
covered in order to avoid a possible violation of Section 16(c) which 
prohibits all forms of short sales. 
The only application of the short-selling provision to options was in the 
1961 case of Silverman y.!. Landa. (4) Here the court held that a registered 
insider who writes a call on shares which he already owns is not in violation 
of Section 16(c). This decision raises the question of whether writing a 
naked call would be considered a violation of the prohibition against 
short-selling. Though such facts were not before the court in the Silverman 
case, it was suggested by the Sa:: at that time that a violation would be 
present under such facts. Based on the Silverman decision, it would seem 
imprudent for an insider to write a call option unless he owns shares 
sufficient to cover the option. The previous exanple can be used to 
illustrate Strategy 2. 
CAl April 6, 1980 with XYZ stock selling for $50 per share, A writes the 
XYZ O::tober 55 put on 500 shares. the put is currently selling for $8 ($5 of 
IV plus $3 of 'lVP) and A thus receives $4,000. CAl April IS, after the price 
of XYZ stock has risen to $55 per share, A writes an XYZ O::tober 50 call 
against 500 shares of stock which he already owns. The call is currently 
selling for $8 ($5 of IV plus $3 of 'lVP), hence A receives an additional 
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$4,000. On October 21, the date of expiration, if XYZ stock is selling for 
rrore than $55, the put will expire worthless, but the call will be 
in-the-rroney and A will be obligated to sell 500 shares of XYZ COJllllon at $50 
per share. If XYZ sells for $40 per share or less, then the call will expire 
worthless, but the put will be in-the-rroney. A will thus be obligated to 
purchase 500 shares of XYZ at $55 per share (which it will be assumed he then 
sells; alternatively, it can be assumed A repurchases the put just prior to 
assigrunent). If on the expiration date, XYZ stock is selling for rrore than 
$50 but less than $55 per share then both the put and the call will be 
in-the-money. In this case A will be obligated to purchase 500 shares at $55 
and sell 500 shares at $50. The profitability of this trading strategy is 
tabulated in Table 2, and the corresponding profit graph is depicted in Figure 
2. 
Using Strategy 2, A will realize a profit upon expiration of the options 
as long as the underlying stock is priced between $39 and $66 per share. 
Furtherrrore, A will receive the maximJrn profit of $5,500 if XYZ happens to be 
selling for between $50 and $55 per share. This strategy can only be 
implemented through a margin account and since very little cash will be tied 
up, the potential returns are very large. 
The third strategy enables the insider to profit from negative inside 
information through sillUlating a short sale. This strategy thus circumvents 
the Section 16(c) provision outlawing short sales. Strategy 3 requires that 
the insider write an in-the-rroney call (on shares which he already owns) prior 
to public disclosure of negative information regarding his corporation. When 
this information is disseminated, the price of his corporation's stock will 
fall resulting in a similar decline in the call premium. If the insider could 
buy back the call at this time he could realize a gain on that position. 'lb 
avoid violation of l6(b), he instead writes an in-the-money put. 
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Table 2 
Profit Table for Insider Trading Strategy 2 
PRICES 00 EXPIRATIoo DATE 
XYZ XYZ cx::r XYZ cx::r Pill' CALL TOl'AL 
STOCK 55 Pur 50 CALL PHOFIT PHOFIT PHOFIT 
35 20 0 -12 8 -4 
39 16 0 -8 8 0 
40 15 0 -7 8 1 
45 10 0 -2 8 6 
50 5 0 3 8 11 
55 0 5 8 3 11 
60 0 10 8 -2 6 
65 0 15 8 -7 1 
66 0 16 8 -8 0 
70 0 20 8 -12 -4 
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There are several potential problems with this strategy. First, if the 
underlying shares which the insider already owns have been held for at least 
six IID!lths, he would be justified in siJltlly selling those shares when he 
obtains the negative information. this tactic would enable him to avoid the 
comnission costs involved in using Strategy 3. On the other hand, he is now 
prohibited by l6(b) from repurchasing those shares during the subsequent six 
month period; furthermore, he must forego any dividend payments made during 
that period. 
An alternative to sirtply selling the stock when the bad news is received, 
would be to write a calIon that stock in order to diminish the downside risk. 
The insider would be justified in doing this if he has not owned the stock for 
at least six months (and is thus prohibited from selling), or if he sinply 
does not wish to forego any dividend payments. Both these two tactics allow 
the insider to avoid a loss, however, neither enables him to profit from his 
foreknowledge of a price decline. 
Strategy 3 is the most profitable trading technique to employ if (1) the 
insider is prohibited from selling his stock; (2) the insider does not wish to 
forego any dividend payments; and/or (3) the insider feels the price decline 
will be relatively shortlived. For instance, if the insider locks in his 
profits on the call and the price of the underlying stock subsequently rises 
back to its original level, he will have profited from the option strategy 
while losing nothing on the underlying stock. Consider the following example. 
A is on the board of directors of XYZ Corporation. On January 10, 1981 A 
learns that XYZ's fourth quarter earnings figures have dropped far below 
analysts predictions. The decline is due to unexpectedly high start-up costs 
for XYZ's newest production facility. A feels that the problems, though 
presently very serious, will be solved within several months. A owns 500 
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shares of XYZ collllOn stock currently selling for $50 per share. Based on his 
knowledge of an inpending decline in the pr ice of XYZ stock A has three 
irrmediate choices available: (1) do nothing, (2) sell his 500 shares, and (3) 
write an in-the-money calIon his shares. A rejects the do-nothing strategy 
as too risky. Though A has owned his shares for several years and is thus 
under no legal obligation to hold them, he rejects the sell strategy because 
he does not wish to forego the 2 1/2 percent quarterly dividend which XYZ pays 
on each share of stock. Consequently, A chooses to write an in-the-m::mey call 
qn his shares of stock. en January 11, A writes 500 O:::tober 45 calls 
currently selling at a premium of $10. Fbr this he receives $5,000. (He 
sells the O:::tober calls, rather than the July calls, since he knows the 
earnings figures won't be released until after January 22 which is less than 
six months prior to the July expiration date.) The XYZ earnings figures are 
released on January 29, and XYZ stock closes that day at $45 per share. en 
January 30 A writes 500 XYZ O:::tober 50 puts each currently selling for $9. 
For this A receives an additional $4,500. en the expiration date, O:::tober 19, 
if XYZ is selling for more than $50 per share, the put will expire worthless, 
but the call will be in-the-money and A will be obligated to sell 500 shares 
at $45 per share. If XYZ is selling for $45 per share or less, then the call 
will expire worthless but the put will then be in-the-money. A will thus be 
obligated to purchase 500 shares of XYZ stock at $50 per share (which we will 
assume he then sells). Finally, if XYZ stock is selling for more than $45 but 
less than $50 per share, then both the put and the call will be in-the-m::mey. 
In this event, A will be obligated to purchase 500 shares at $50 and sell 500 




Profit Table for Insider Trading Strategy 3 
PRICES 00 EXPIRATIOO Dl\TE 
XYZ XYZ OCT XYZ OCT CALL Pur TOl'AL 
STOCK 45 CALL 50 PtJr ProFIT ProFIT ProFIT 
25 0 25 10 -16 -6 
30 0 20 10 -11 -1 
31 0 19 10 -10 0 
35 0 15 10 -6 4 
40 0 10 10 -1 9 
45 0 5 10 4 14 
50 5 0 5 9 14 
55 10 0 0 9 9 
60 15 0 - 5 9 4 
64 19 0 -9 9 0 
65 20 0 -10 9 -1 
70 25 0 -15 9 -6 
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Using this third strategy, A will realize a profit on the expiration date 
as long as XYZ stock is priced between $31 and $64 per share. Furthermore, A 
will receive a maximum profit of $7,000 if XYZ happens to be selling for $45 
to $50 per share. 
This chapter has presented three trading strategies which, if used in 
conjunction with the guidelines for reducing legal risk, appear capable of 
skirting existing insider trading regulations. The question which now arises 
is whether registered insiders are actually practicing one or more of these 
trading techniques. Designing a methodology which will provide an answer to 
this question is the problem which will now be addressed. 
(1) Goldberg [15), p. 106. 
(2) For a discussion of options and option strategies, see 
Gastineau [14] or McMillian [341 • . 
(3) SEC Docket [47], p. 890. 
(4) Goldberg [151, p. 127. 
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OJAPTER 6 
The profitable use of trading strategies 1, 2, arrl 3 by registered 
insiders may involve a violation of Rule lOb-S in addition to the 
circumvention of various provisions of Section 16. Consequently, evidence 
that these trading methods are being successfully employed provides sufficient 
proof that the existing federal regulations of insider trading are not 
accurately stated. Under some oonditions this evidence may also inply that 
the regulations are not adequately enforced. Designing a methodology which 
will provide the greatest probability of locating this evidence (if it exists) 
given the relevant time and budget constraints is the problem addressed in 
this chapter. 
Throughout this paper, it has been implicitly assumed that insiders are 
risk averse. This inplies that registered insiders are most likely to use one 
of the three trading strategies under conditions where their legal risk is 
relatively small. Recall that legal risk is reduced by (1) trading on less 
significant information, (2) trading well in advance of public disclosure, (3) 
trading on low volume arrl (4) trading in deep markets. The first and fourth 
factors provide a basis for determining where and relative to what events the 
anticipated types of trading behavior are most likely to be observed. The 
second factor is problematic since it enlarges the time period which IlUst be 
searched. 
The issue of depth is an important one because all three of the proposed 
trading strategies involve option transactions. Markets for put and call 
options are characteristically less deep than the corresponding markets for 
stock. FUrthermore, during the period for which data on registered insider 
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transactions is available, options trading was less popular ~han it is today. 
Therefore, attention must be focused specifically on insider trading activity 
in corporations having relatively deep markets for their put and call options 
during this period. 
There are inn~~rable possible events which could occur to positively or 
negatively influence a corporation's future prospects, and the informed 
insider could choose to trade on any of these. FurtherIlOre, he could execute 
his initial transaction at any time subsequent to his obtaining the relevant 
information and prior to the time when that information is made public. Thus, 
two methodological problems must be confronted: (1) determining, in a 
non-arbitrary fashion, the types of news events which will be examined, and 
(2) minimizing the time period which must be scrutinized prior to each news 
event. 
Examining unexpected earnings announcements provides an adequate solution 
to both methodological problems. First, earnings information, though 
potentially very valuable, will never carry the significance of merger or 
takeover information. For an insider trading aboveboard, use of this latter 
information will "alI1Ost certainly involve a greater degree of legal risk than 
use of the former. thus it is IIOre likely that one of the three trading 
strategies will be observed in relation to earnings announcements than in 
relation to IIOre significant news events. 
There is a second reason for choosing to focus on unexpected earnings 
information. Because earnings information pertains to a specific period of 
time, this information cannot be positively known by anyone prior to the end. 
of the period in question. This is especially true when unexpected earnings 
information is considered. Hence, the insider who bases his trading decisions 
on unexpected quarterly earnings information will, in all likelihood, execute 
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his initial transaction at some point following the close of the quarter but 
before this information is made public. Since the date on which any past 
earnings announcement has been made is a known fact, the time period between 
the end of the quarter and the subsequent announcement of that quarter's 
earnings can be precisely identified. In other words, for any past quarterly 
earnings figures for any corporation it is possible to determine the exact 
time period during which an insider would have had to make his initial 
transaction if he were trading on that information. This fact significantly 
reduces the amount of transactions data that RUst be searched to locate the 
anticipated behavior. FUrthermore, since the length of these time periods is 
relatively short (generally less than six weeks) and since all three proposed 
trading strategies have distinct characteristics, then the occurance of 
trading behavior identical to that anticipated can be attributed to the 
insider's desire to profit from his knowledge of unreleased earnings 
information. 
At this point, the specific procedure for selecting the corporations to 
examine will be presented. Since this study will focus on the period from 
January 1977 through December 1980, the decision should be based upon the 
state of the market during these four years. ~pecifically, whether or not a 
corporation is deemed acceptable for this study should pivot on whether or not 
there exists a relatively deep market for options to purchase or sell that 
corporation's stock dur log the period under study. One solution to this 
problem would be to choose corporations having the highest average daily 
option trading volume during the period under consideration. However, in 
reviewing the nature of the three strategies presented, it is apparent that 
this method would not necessarily ,provide a list of corporations whose 
insiders are most likely to use these strategies. Note that the trading 
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strategies involve writing in-the-money call and/or put options; furthermore, 
the deeper these options are in-the-money, the lower the downside risk (since 
the profits will be more securely locked in). Obviously, there is an 
advantage to having several in-the-money options from which to choose. 
Furthermore, no matter how deep the options market is for a particular stock, 
none of the three insider trading strategies can be used if no in-the-money 
options are offered. '!be fact that the converse of this statement is not 
necessarily true, suggests that an acceptable procedure for choosing the 
corporations to be examined in this study involves selecting those which 
typically have the largest number of strike prices offered on their option 
contracts during the 1977-80 period. Specifically, the original list of 
corporations was obtained by eliminating all carpanies which did not have at 
least three strike prices offered on their call options in three of the four 
years from 1977-80. This original list included 91 corporations. 
Next, it is necessary to devise a method for corrpiling a list of 
unexpected earnings announcements occuring during the 1977-80 period for each 
of the previously selected corporations; The difficulty lies in defining 
'unexpected.' It is iIrportant to keep in mind that the goal of this study is 
not to compose a list of unexpected earnings reports; rather, this list will 
only serve as a menas for eliminating periods of time during which the trading 
strategies are less likely to be used. Thus devoting a considerable amount of 
time toward this one methodological point is unnecessary. 
When a corporation's earnings figures are released, the information 
content of those figures will be incorporated in the price of that firm's 
stock. If the earnings figures are in line with analysts' predictions, then 
there will be very little information contained in the announcement which is 
not already reflected in the security's price. However, if the earning~ 
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figures exceed or fail to meet analysts' estimated, then the price of the 
stock will rise or fall until the information contained in those figures has 
been fully incorporated in the price. 
For the purpose of this study, a firm's quarterly earnings announcement 
will be defined as unexpected if there is a concurrent change in the price of 
a share of that corporation's stock of at least five percent. Due to the way 
earnings figures are announced, it is often impossible to determine the exact 
day on which the figures are released. For instance, if an earnings report is 
printed in Wednesday's Wall Street Journal, it cannot be determined whether 
the armouncement was made before or after Tuesday's market closed. For this 
reason it is necessary that two day's trading activity be examined in 
connection with each earnings announcement: the day prior to publication and 
the day of publication. Specifically, a company's earnings figures will be 
consider!'!d unexpected if (1) there is a price change of at least five percent 
on the day preceding publication; (2) there is a price change of at least five 
percent on the day of publication; or (3) the net price change over the two 
day period is at least five percent. 
Fbr each of the 91 corporations on the previous list, all earnings 
announcements during the four-year period were examined. All corporations for 
which no unexpected earnings announcements were found were eliminated from the 
list. After this step was Cdlrpleted, 56 corporations remained with a total of 
144 unexpected earnings announcements. Since the size of this list greatly 
exceeded the size which could be adequatley studied, the decision was made to 
eliminate corporations until a minimum of twenty corporations and fifty 
unexpected earnings announcements remained. It -was desirable to choose a 
method of elimination which would retain those announceIrents which offered the 
greatest potential for using one of the three strategies. This was 
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accomplished by computing the total number of call option strike prices 
offered by each corporation over the four year period. Firms offering the 
fewest number of strike prices were eliminated ·until further eliminations 
WO!Jld result in violation of the desired minil1lllllS. The final list contains 23 
corporations and 61 unexpected earnings announcements. 
For each unexpected earnings announcement on this final list, it is 
necessary to determine a set of time per iods in which trades would have 
occurred if one of the proposed strategies were being utilized by the insider. 
Furthermore, it is possible to determine the types of trades which arE 
expected to occur in each of the time periods. It is now necessary t .J 
describe in detail what these time periods and the corresponding expected 
trades will look like for each trading strategy. 
Trading Strategy 1 involves the purchase of common stock before the 
earnings announcement, the writing of an in-the-money call following the 
announcement, and the subsequent disposition of stock through exercise of the 
call on the expiration date (which is at least six months after the call was 
written) • It has been inplicitly assumed that the call is in-the""1lX)ney upon 
expiration; this need not be the case. If the call expires out-of-the-money, 
then the insider mayor may not choose to sell the underlying stock once the 
expiraton date has passed. At first blush this observation seems to introduce 
some complications into the methodology. For instance, if a sale of the stock 
is not observed on or shortly after the expiration date of the call, is it 
possible that trading strategy 1 was not in fact being used? The answer to 
this question is no. In fact, it is not necessary that dispostion of the 
stock be observed: if the call expires in-the-money, then the stock will 
undoubtedly be sold due to exercise; it is not necessary to observe this to 
know it has hawened. On the other hand, if the call expires worthless, then 
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the insider's decision regarding whether or not to sell the stock will depend 
upon (among other things) his expectations of the firm's prospects at that 
time. If the insider chooses not to sell the stock, this does not imply that 
he has not used or not benefitted fran trading strategy 1-
The significance of all this from a methodological perspective is that in 
order to identify a particular insiders' trading behavior as strategy 1, it is 
not necessary to observe the disposition of the tl«> posi tions( i. e. , exercise 
of call or I«>rthless expiration of call and sale of stock). 
Now, if it is unnecessary to observe any transaction on or after the 
expiration date of the call in order to conclude that strategy 1 has been 
used, then what of the period between the writing of the call and that call's 
expiration date? It can be argued that it is also unnecessary to observe any 
of the insider's transactions during this period. It has already been pointed 
out that ~,e call's expiration date is at least six months after the date on 
which it is written. (If this is not the case, then the insider will have 
violated Section 16(b) upon expiration of the call.) DJring the six month 
period immediately following the call transaction, the insider must not 
purchase a call or sell stock in his corporation. If he does then he will 
have violated Section 16 (b) and will have any profits disgorged. Furthermore, 
any other (legal) transactions which the insider makes in his corporation's 
securities during t hese six months (e.g., pruchasing more stock, writing 
additional calls, etc.) can be considered independent of his strategy 1 
position and thus uniJltlortant. 
It is now necessary to examine the period of time after the first six 
months have passed but prior to the call's expiration date. DJring this 
period the insider is free to make any trades he wishes without violating the 
short swing rule. If he decides to sell his stock and buy back the call prior 
to expiration, then he will still realize a profit from strategy 1 (though 
this will involve commission costs on two transactions rather than one). 
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Insofar as the methodology is concerned, this all boils down to the fact that 
any transactions the insider makes subsequent to writing the call can be 
considered independent of his strategy 1 position and hence they need not be 
observed. In other words, it is only necessary to observe two things in order 
to determine that an attenpt is being made on the part of the insider to 
circumvent the short swing rule through strategy 1: 
1. The insider IlUst have purchased shares of stock prior to the quarterly 
earnings announcement but subsequent to the close of the quarter in 
question. 
2. The insider IlUst have written an in-the-money call within five 
trading days following the earnings announcement. The expiration date of 
this call IlUst be at least six months subsequent to the date of purchase. 
Notice that in searching for the date on which the call was written 
(requirement 2), only the five trading days immediately following the earnings 
announcement are scrutinized. Though the information contained in the 
earnings figures should be incorporated in the stock's price on the date of 
announcement (assuming the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis 
holds), the insider might not write the call for several days subsequent to 
the anrxJUncement. 
Similar arguments to those made regarding the necessary observations 
required to identify an insider's use of trading strategy 1 can be applied to 
trading strategy 2. Thus the type of trading behavior which is expected if an 
insider is using strategy 2 can be summarized as follows: 
1. The insider IlUst have written an in-the""'lOOl'ley put prior to the 
quarterly earnings announcement but subsequent to the close of the quarter 
in question. The expiration date of this put IlUst be at least six rnonths 
subsequent to the date of purchase. (It is expected that this option will 
have the same expiration date as the option written follC1tling the earnings 
announcement. ) 
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2. The insider IlUst have written an in-the"1lDney call within five trading 
days following the earnings announcement. The expiration date of this 
call IlUst be at least six months subsequent to the date of purchase. 
Finally, the observed behavior for trading strategy 3 is presented below: 
1. The insider IlUst have 'written an in-the-money call prior to the 
quarterly earnings announcement but subsequent to the close of the quarter 
in question. The expiration date of this call IlUst be at least six months 
subsequent to the date of purchase. (It is expected that this option will 
have the same expiration date as the option written following the earnings 
announcement. ) 
2. The insider IlUst have written an in-the~y put within five trading 
days following the earnings announcement. The expiration date of this put 
IlUst be at least six months subsequent to the date of purchase. 
Insiders are required to disclose their trades on the SEC's Form 4, 
entitled "Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities." The 
insider must file this form within ten days after the month in which any 
change in beneficial ownership of securities has occurred. These forms 
provide the source for all data used in this study. Any stock purchased or 
sold by the insider will be recorded in Table I, while any options 
transactions will be reported in Table II. 
Appendix 1 contains 3 photocopied Form 4' s (two pages each). The first 
two pages represent how trading strategy 1 might appear on a Form 4 filing 
with the SEC. Note that the information recorded on this form corresporrls to 
the example presented earlier involving insider A of the XYZ Corporation. The 
secorrl Form 4 represents A's use of strategy 2, and the third Form 4 
illustrates A's use of strategy 3. Though in each case both trades appear on 
the same filing, this need not occur in actual practice. 
To determine whether Section 16 (b) is being circumvented along with 
violations of RIle lOb-5, Form 4' s will be examined during the period from 
1977 through 1980. The specific Fbrms examined will be those which corresporrl 
to periods of time surrounding unexpected earnings announcements. 
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In particular, relative to each unexpected earnings announcement, there 
exi sts a corresponding tiIre period during which one might expect to observe 
the use, by insiders, of one or rore of the three strategies. (The list of 
unexpected earnings announcements is given in Appendix 4, while Appendix 5 
contains a list of the Form 4' s corresponding to these announcements.) The 
statistic which will be collected is the fraction of all insiders trading 
during all relevant tiIre periods who made use of one of the three strategies. 
Conclusions and policy i.l!plications will be drawn based upon the magnitude of 
this statistic. 
CHAPl'ER 7 
Examining the Fbrm 4 Statements as detailed in the previous chapter 
yielded no evidence of insiders' use of the proposed trading strategies. 
Furthel1OOre, there were no instances of insiders writing options (either puts 
or calis) during the relevant time periods. There are four possible 
explanations for this absence of significant findings. 
The most obvious explanation is that the proposed trading strategies are 
not as profitable as pure stock transactions. That is to suggest that an 
insider who follows strategy 1 ~ld, in the long run, be worse off than an 
insider who simply purchased stock, held it for s ix months, and then sold. 
The latter strategy will henceforth be referred to as a 'buy-and-hold' 
strategy. The plausibility of this explanation will now be tested. 
Fbr each of the 44 positive unexpected earnings announcements listed in 
Appendix 4, a collparison can be made between the returns from using strategy 1 
and the returns from using a buy-and-hold strategy. 'lb allow for 
c:arparability, several simplifying assUllptions are needed. 
Strategy 1 Assumptions 
(1) On the first trading day folowing the end of the quarter, an insider 
purchases 500 shares of stock at that day's closing price. 
(2) Fbllowing the five percent price rise associated with the earnings 
announcement, the insider writes call options on 500 shares of stock. He 
chooses the call which is nearest to but not less than ten points 
in-the;roney. If no calls are offered which are at least ten points 
in-the-money, then he writes the call which is most deeply in-the-noney. 
The expiration date chosen is the one which is nearest to but not less 
than six months in the future. 
(3) The insider holds both positions until the call's expiration date, at 
which time the stock is sold. If, upon expiration, the call is 
in-the;roney, then the stock is sold at the strike price, otherwise the 




(1) This insider purchases 500 shares of stock on the same day and at the 
same price as the insider using strategy 1. 
(2) This insider sells his 500 shares on the same day as the strategy 1 
insider; however, his selling price is always the closing price. 
The internal rate of return on the buy-and-hold strategy can be conp.lted 
by manipulating the present value forllUla: 
so + CSO = (S2 - CS2)/(1 + r~f· . 
Here, the present value of the buy-and-hold strategy, SO + CSO, Equals the 
future cash flow, S2 - CS2, discounted at the rate of return r8l\. Solving for 
r .. yields, 
~'i y(S2 - CS2)/(SO + CSO) - 1 
where: 
r~ = the internal rate of return ~ed daily 
on the buy-and-hold strategy. 
t. = the number of days form the purchase date to 
sale date. 
50 = the purchasing price of 500 shares of stock. 
CSO = conunission charges on SO. (The conunission 
schedule is listed in Appendix 6.) 
52 = the sale price of 500 shares of stock. 
CS2 = conmission charges on S2. 
, 
'lb conpute the internal rate of return for strategy 1, the following forllUla 
would have to be solved for r51. 
50 + CSO 
where: 
'" Wl-oo. + 
(1 + r,,)"' 
- --52 - CS2 
(1 + r,,)"' 
r., : the internal rate of return on strategy 1. 
tl '" the number of days from the purchase date 
to the date on which the calls are written. 
52 '" sale price of 500 shares of stock, 
= 52 if calls are out-of-the-money upon 
expiration. 
'" the strike price of the calls if they 
are in-the-money upon expiration. 
CS2 '" commission charges on 52. 
WI '" amount received for writing calls on 500 
shares of stock. 
00. '" commission charges on WI. 
(*) 
Unfortunately, this equation cannot be solved explicitly for rsl ' There is, 
however, an alternative to direct comparison of the returns associated with 
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the two strategies. If r O" is substituted for r" in equation (*), then it is 
possible to solve the right side for the present value of strategy 1 
discounted at the internal rate of return on the buy-and-hold strategy. This 
figure can then be COIIpared to the left side of the equation, SO + CSO, which 
represents the present value of the buy-and-hold strategy. This approach is 
illustrated by the following relationship: 
~ -50 + CSO Wl - 00. + 52 - CS2 
(1 + r ",)t, (1 + r ",)t. 
If the right side of the above equation exceeds the left side, then this 
implies that for a given unexpected earnings announcement, the insider would 
have been better off using strategy 1 than using the buy-and-hold strategy. 
These calculations were performed for 38 of the positive unexpected 
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earnings announcements. (1) The results indicated that in 25 of the cases 
(apprOKimately 66 percent), the return on strategy 1 would have exceeded the 
return on a buy-and-hold strategy. Although it appears that the buy-and-hold 
strategy is inferior to strategy 1, rothing has yet been said regarding the 
profitability of the buy-and-hold strategy relative to strategies 2 or 3. 
Strategies 2 and 3 are essentially the same, thus, what applies to 
strategy 2 IlUst also apply to strategy 3. Strategy 2 involves writing a put 
and subsequently writing a call. Both these transactions result in the writer 
receiving cash, thus making it difficult to COIlpUte a meaningful return. 
Nevertheless, it is fairly obvious that if strategy 2 were used in place of 
strategy 1, it would yield a higher return. This is because it yields cash 
flows which are similar in magnitude to those received for strategy 1, yet 
reguires a much smaller cash cammittment. Consequently, strategy 2 (as well 
as strategy 3) can be considered superior to a buy-and~hold strategy. Based 
on these results, the explanation that strategies 1, 2, and 3 are not as 
profitable as a buy-and-hold strategy seems implausible. 
A secon:'I explanation for why the strategies were not observed is that 
perhaps insiders perceive the value of the punishment for using strategies 1, 
2, or 3 IlUltiplied by the legal risk as exceeding the expected utility from 
using a particular strategy. This implies one of two possibilities. First, 
it may be that these strategies were not observed in the periods examined 
because their 'use would have involved a lOb-5 violation, and that the legal 
risk associated with this violation exceeded that ~ich the insiders were 
willing to bear. This is unlikely for two reasons. First, previous studies 
(see Chapter 4) have produced results which strongly suggest that the legal 
risk associated with lOb-5 violations is rot sufficient to deter many insiders 
from trading based on inside information. Second, as pointed out in Chapter 
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5, the SEC has developed a set of priorities which give relatively little 
weight to enforcing Rule lOb-5 as it pertains to events such as earnings 
announcements. Peruran' s (381 findings also support this conclusion. Hence, 
for these two reasons, it aH;>ears unlikely that the legal risk associated with 
a lOb-5 violation is, by itself, sufficient to deter all insiders from using 
strategies 1, 2, or J. 
'lbe second possibility suggested by this _explanation is that when the 
perceived legal risk associated with writing the options is combined with the 
legal risk associated with the lOb-5 violation (occuring after the initial 
transaction), the resulting probability of detection exceeds that which the 
insiders are willing to bear. In other words, insiders perceive there to be 
some legal risk associated with writing an option after an earnings 
announcement is made. Certainly there is no lOb-5 violation, since this 
transaction occurs after the earnings information is made public. 
FurtherllOre, there is no 16 (b) violation as was pointed out in Chapter 5. 
However, despite the fact that the legal risk associated with a 16(b) 
violation is zero when these strategies are used, insiders may perceive this 
risk to be nonzero. Thus, one plausible explanation is that insiders do not 
realize that strategies 1, 2, and 3 do not involve violations of Section 
16(b). 
A third explanation for why use of the trading strategies was not observed 
is that they are either too involved or too difficult to understand. A test 
to determined whether this explanation is reasonable would be to examine the 
transactions of insiders in the securities of other corporations. If the test 
produced no evidence of insiders using strategies 1, 2, or 3 when they traded 
the securities of other firms, then this explanation could not be rejected. 
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A fourth explanation is that insiders who are knowledgable enough about 
insider trading regulations and stock options to come up with strategies 1, 2, 
or 3, are probably knowledgable enough to circumvent the entire disclosure 
process. '!bat is, a shre<Nd insider could easily trade through a third party 
the day before an announcement, and trade again the day after, failing to 
disclose either transaction to the SF.X::. '!be only clue left behind by this 
strategy is an increase in trading volume, and this trace can easily be 
covered by making small trades at discrete intervals. Even when the SEC 
notices an increase in trading, major problems remain. According to Dooley 
[9], once this hawens, 
the oommission must be prepared to scrutinize carefully trading records to 
learn the identities of purchasers, to devise criteria to winnow the 
suspicious trades, to search that list to see whether any patterns or 
other indications of relationships emerge that demonstrate possible access 
to inside information, and to interview the purchasers and others to 
determine whether such access in fact existed and whether the restricted 
information probably was conveyed and acted upon. The Comnission rust go 
through this tedious process before it can decide whether an enforcement 
action would be worthwhile. (2) 
'!bis chapter has presented three plausible explanations for why insider 
usage of trading strategies 1, 2, or 3 was not observed. '!be first is that 
insiders wrongly perceive these strategies to involve violations of Section 
16(b}. This perceived legal risk, when added to the legal risk asso:::iated 
with a lOb-5 violation exceeds the level of legal risk insiders are willing to 
bear in order to obtain the profits connected with the use of these 
strategies. '!be second explanatiCXI is that use of these trading strategies is 
too conplex to understand or too time consLmling to warrent their use. 
Finally, it was proposed that perhaps insiders who are perceptive enough to 
consider using these strategies would opt for a strategy of nondisclosure. 
'!bat is, they would find it IIOre profitable and less tedious to sinply · trade 
through a third party or Swiss bank account and reap even greater returns. 
FCXJmOl'ES TO CHAPTER 7 
(1) Six of the 44 positive announcements were excluded. 'lliree 
announcements required price data from February, 1980. 
'lliis data was unavailable. 'lliree other announcements 
exhibited a fall in price between the stock purchase date 
and the date on which the call was to be written. Returns 
were not computed for these since it was assumed that 
insiders would have no desire to lock in a loss using one 
of the trading strategies. 
(2) Dooley 9, p. 19-20. 
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CHAPl'ER 8 
This study has sought to determine the effectiveness of current federal 
insider trading regulations--specifically, Section 16 of the 1934 SEA and Rule 
10b-S promulgated in 1942. It was assumed that the effectiveness of such 
proscriptions is conditional upon the extent to which they are enforced and 
the manner in which they are stated. 
Due to the ambitious nature of Rule 10b-S, the SEC's enforcement efforts 
have been hampered by two fundamental weaknesses. First, the detection of 
10b-S violations has become an increasingly frustrating task despite the aid 
of sophisticated computer systems employed by the SEC and the self-regulated 
security exchanges. It is apparent that various tactics exploited by persons 
possessing inside information have enabled a large proportion of violations to 
go undetected. Second, even when possible 10b-5 violations are uncovered, 
additional obstacles have been encountered when attempting to obtain 
convictions. Although criminal convictions carry stiff penalties, successful 
prosecutions have been extremely rare. As a consequence, the relatively 
unexacting civil penalties have become the effective sanction for violating 
Rule 10b-5. The existence of these problems has forced the SEC to make 
compromises regarding the types of violations it pursues most vigorously. 
Specifically, it now appears that the SEC's enforcement efforts are directed 
almost exclusively toward detecting egr~ious violations which can be settled , 
at relatively low cost through civil injunctions. Consequently, registered 
insiders wishing to control their level of legal risk can do so by altering 
the type of information upon which their trades are based and by adjusting the 
volume and timing of their transactions. 
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In addition to the difficulties associated with the enforcement of Rule 
13b-5, major shortcomings are also apparent in the construction of Section 16. 
Specifically, this section does not explicitly prohibit the use of various 
trading strategies which would be considered harmful by proponents of the 
traditional viewpoint. This study presented three such trading strategies 
which employ the use of exchange traded stock options to lock in an 'on paper' 
profit thereby enabling registered insiders to legally circumvent Section 
16(b). When used in conjunction with the guidelines for controlling legal 
risk, these tactics represent a powerful device for skirting federal insider 
trading laws. 
A methodology was developed to determine whether these strategies were 
being employed by registered insiders in order to defer short swing profits 
accruing as a result of firm specific events. In this study the events chosen 
were unexpected earnings announcements. 
An examination of the trading activity of registered insiders surrounding 
the dates of unexpected earnings announcements during the period from January, 
1977 through December, 198~ yielded no evidence that the proposed trading 
strategies were being used. The most plausible explanation for this result is 
that the opportunity cost of utilizing these strategies is too great to 
justify their use. This excessive cost may be due to their relatively high 
degree of complexity and/or to the existence of alternative strategies capable 
of providing greater returns without exorbitant levels of financial or legal 
risk (e.g., trading through third parties or SWiss bank accounts). 
The findings of this study are twofold. First, despite the fact that the 
use of the proposed trading strategies was not observed, they remain a 
practicable means for legally circumventing Section 16(b). Hence, it can be 
concluded that due to their failure to fully recognize the existence of a 
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commercial market for stock options, current regulations of insider trading 
are not accuratley constructed. Second, although existing evidence strongly 
suggests that the SEC's enforcement policies allow a significant proportion of 
13b-5 violations by registered insiders to go undetected, the findings of this 
study do not support this conclusion. 
Based upon these results it becomes necessary to determine whether the 
existing regulations should be modified to explicitly prohibit the use of 
trading strategies such as those presented in this paper. One possible 
modification would be to simply invoke a flat prohibition on all trading in 
commercial stock options by registered insiders. Another less extreme measure 
would be to &~end Section 16(b) making it illegal for registered insiders to 
execute more than one option transaction (regardless of the type of option and 
the type of transaction) during a six month period. 
The principal costs of modifying the federal insider trading regulations 
would be incurred as a result of the additional enforcement measures taken to 
insure compliance with the new provisions. From a traditional standpoint, the 
benefits associated with such modifications would be those accruing as a 
result of eliminating the risk of wealth losses to insiders as a consequence 
of their use of the proposed trading strategies. However, the fact that this 
study uncovered no evidence that the strategies are being used by registered 
insiders suggests that the losses incurred by outsiders due to these tactics 
is negligible. If this is true, then it is likely that modifying the existing 
regulations would involve marginal enforcement costs which exceed the marginal 
loss from allowing the existing loopholes to remain. A further argument 
against modifying the existing regulations can be based upon the explanation 
that use of the proposed trading strategies was not observed because of the 
existence of more lucrative trading schemes. If this is indeed the case, then 
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resources should not be devoted to modifying the existing regulations until 
the SEC is able to capably enforce the regulations as they now stand • 
. . 
APPENDIX 1 
Insider Trading Strategies 1, 2, and 3 
As They Would Appear on the S~' s Form 4: 
Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities 
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The Cady, Roberts Decision* 
In early November, 1959, Robert M. Gintel, a securities broker of Cady, 
Hoberts and Go., was notified by Curtiss-Wright Gorp. that a public 
presentation of their .new engine would take place on November 23. Since only 
2,000 such invitations were sent out prior to the presentation date, the 
information they contained was not considered public until that date. 
D.lr ing the per ied from libvenber 6 to the day of the presentation, Mr. Gintel 
pruchased 11,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright stock for his clients. On November 
24, the day follolNing the presentation, the stock rose from 32 to 35 1/4. By 
11:00 a.m. on the 25th, Mr. Gintel had sold 6,500 Curtiss-Wright shares. 
Also on the morning of the 25th, directors of Curtiss-Wright met and 
approved a reduced Dividend for the following quarter. A representative of 
Cady, R::berts and Go. who had attended the board meeting, notified Mr. Gintel 
of the news shortly after 11 :00 a.m. By 11 :18 Mr. Gintel had sold an 
additional 7,000 shares (including short sales) of Curtiss-Wright stock. 
Because of an unexplained delay, news of the dividend cut did not reach the 
NYSE until nearly 12:30 p.m. Curtiss-wright closed trading that day down 4 
1/2 points. 
Mr. Gintel and Cady, Roberts and Go. were found guilty of violations of 
Section lOeb), Section 17(a), and Rule 10b-5. Gintel was fined $3,000 and 
received a twenty day suspension from the New York Stock Exchange. 
The Cady, lbberts Decision was iIrportant for two reasons. First, it 
extended liability to persons other than corporate officers, directors, and 
large shareholders. Second, it clarified the antifraud provisions of the 
Securities Exchange Act. 
*Jaffe [20], pp. 117-118. 
A-9 
APPENDIX 3 
The Texas Gulf Sulfur Case* 
In 1959 the Texas G.1lf Sulfur Co. began conducting exploratory activities 
in Canada's Ontario Province. Coresanples collected on N:>veni:ler 12, 1963 
indicated evidence of unusually large mineral deposits in the area of Timmins, 
Ontario. At this time, TGS stock was selling on the NYSE at about ~18 per 
share. TGS wanted the informatioo kept secret to allow them time to acquire 
rights to surrounding lands and conduct further exploration. This objective 
was acconplished by enploying numerous ruses including the issuance of a 
misleading press release on April 12, 1964. 
D.lring the period from Noveni:ler 1963 to March 1964, TGS insiders executed 
purchases of 9,100 shares of stock. furthermore, they leaked this information 
concerning huge mineral depostis to others (referred to as tippees). 'Ihese 
tippees purchased an additional 12,100 shares of stock and acquired optioos to 
buy another 14,100 shares. By the end of April, TGS stock had risen to 30 and 
subsequently continued to rise to a high of 71 within a year. 
On April 19, 1965, the SEC filed suit against TGS and several high ranking 
enployees. 'Ihe enployees were alleged to have based their purchasing 
decisions on the secret information concerning the large mineral finds. 'Ihe 
action sought to conpel defendants to offer restitution to those individuals 
who sold stock or calls to corporate insiders or tippees. 
On August 19, 1966 a decision was handed down declaring that all trading 
prior to April 9, 1964 was not unlawful because the informatioo concerning the 
discovery was not considered to be material at the time. 'frades occurring 
after April 9, however, were declared to be in violatioo of ~le 10b-5. 
*Goldberg [15l, pp.83-100; Jaffe [20], pp.118-119. 
APPENDIX 4 
Dates of Unexpected Earnings Announcements 
Corporation Name 
Positive (+l!Negative (-) 
1. Amerada Hess Corp. 
+ 
2. Bally Mfg. Corp. 
+ 
+ 





4. Control Data Corp. 
+ 
5. Corning Glass Works 
o. Digital Equipment Corp. 
+ 
+ 








APR 24, 1978 
o:T 30, 1~78 
JUL 23, 1979 
APR 28, 1978 
I!KN 1, 1978 
APR 19, 1977 
JAN 22, 19ao 
JUL 22, 1980 
o:T 21, 1980 
APR 13, 1978 
o:T 17, 1~7a 
APR 28, 1978 
AUG 8, B79 
JUL 19, 1977 
JAN 16, 1979 
APR 22, 1980 
o:T 21, 1980 
JON 3, 1980 
SEE' 3, 1980 
DEX; 9, 1980 
A-l0 
Quarter Ending 
FEB 28, 1978 
AUG 31, 1978 
MAY 31, 1979 
MAR 31, 1978 
SEP 29, 1978 
MAR 31, 1977 
00; 31, 1979 
JON 30, 1980 
SEE' 30, 1980 
MAR 31, 1978 
o:T tl, 1978 
MAR 31, 1978 
JON 29, 1979 
JOl'I 30, 1977 
00; 29, 197tl 
MAR 29, 1980 
SEP 30, 1980 
APR 30, 1980 
JUL 31, 1980 
o:T 31, 1980 
A-ll 
9. Ford l'btor Co. 
+ JUL 30, 1980 JlM 30, 1~80 
10. General Dynamics Corp. 
+ AUG 2, 1979 JUN 29, 1979 
MAY 2, 1980 MIlli 29, 1980 
+ NOV 12, 1980 SEP 30, 1980 
11. Halliburton Co. 
+ FEB 8, 1980 DOC 31, 1979 
+ t-oJ 3, 1980 SJ::P 30, 1980 
12. Hewlett-Packard Co. 
+ MAY 21, 1979 APR 30, 1979 
+ AUG 20, 1979 JUL 31, 1979 
FEB 22, 1980 JAN 31, 1980 
13. Hilton Hotels Corp. 
+ JUL 16, 1980 JUN 30, 1980 
ocr 10, 1980 SEP 30, 1980 
14. HoneyWell Inc. 
+ APR. 20, 1977 MAR 31, l':J77 
+ JUL 20, 1978 JUN 30, 1978 
ocr 17, 1978 SEP 29, 1978 
APR 17, 1980 MAR 29, 1980 
15. IBM CafE. 
+ JUL 15, 1977 JUN 30, 1977 
+ JUL 14, 19130 JUN 30, 1980 
16. Litton Industries Inc. 
+ JUN 2, 1978 APR 28, 1978 
+ MAY 23, 1979 APR 30, 1979 
17. McDonnell Ib..Jglas Corp. 
+ APR. 25, 1978 MAR 31, 1~78 
+ JAN 28, 1980 !lEX: 31, 1979 
APR 22, 1980 MAR 29, 1980 
JUL 28, 1980 JUN 30, 1980 
18. Mesa Petroleum Co. 
ocr 26, 1978 SEP 29, 1978 
A-12 
19. National Semiconductor Corp. 
+ MAR 20, 1~78 i\'lAH, 5, 1978 
MAR 17, 1900 MAR 3, 1980 
+ JUN 25, 1980 MAY 31, 1980 
20. Syntex Corp. 
+ t¥N 30, 1978 ocr 31, 1970 
MAY 29, 1980 APR 30, 1980 
21. Tandy Corp. 
+ AUG 14, 1978 JON 30, 1978 
+ AUG 14, 1979 JON 29, 1979 
+ AUG 14, 1980 JON 30, 1900 
22. Teledyne Inc. 
+ OCT 13, 1977 SEP 30, 1977 
+ JAN 17, 1978 DEX:: 30, 1977 
+ JUL 14, 1';;78 JUN 30, 1978 
+ JAN 12, 1979 DEX:: 29, 1978 
+ JM ~, 1980 DEC 31, 1979 
+ APR 9, 1900 MAR 29, 19!jO 
23. Texas Instruments Inc. 
FEB 3, 1978 DOC 30, 1':;177 
JAN 31, 1980 D&: 31, 1':;179 
+ .lUI. 28, 1';;80 JUN 30, 19t1O 
APPENDIX 5 
Form 4 I S Examined 
1. Amerada Hess Corp. 
1978: MAR, APR, MAY, SEP, OCl', N(N 
1979: JUN, JUL 
2. Bally Mfg. Corp. 
1978: APR, MAY, Q(..'l', IiKN 
3. Burlington Northern Inc. 
1977: APR 
1980 : JAN, JUL, CCl' 
4. Control Data Corp. 
1978: APR 
5. Coming Glass Works 
1978: APR 
6. Digital Equipment Corp. 
1978: APR, MAY 
1979 : JUL, AUG 
7. du Pont Co. 
1977: JUL 
1979: JAN 
1980: APR, CCl' 
8. Fluor Corp. 
1980: MAY, JUN, AUG, SEP , 1iKN, DEC 
9. Ford M:>tor Corp. 
1980: JUL, AUG 
10. General Dynamics Corp. 
1979: JUL, AUG 
1980: APR, MAY, CCl', N(N 
11. Halliburton Co. 
1980: JAN, FEB, CCl', IiKN 
12. Hewlett-Packard Co. 
1979: MAY, AUG 
1980: FEB 
13. Hilton Hotels Corp. 
1980: JUL, CCl' 
A-13 
14. Honeywell Inc. 
1977: APR 
197tl: JUl., ocr 
1980: APR 
15. IBM Corp. 
1977: JUL 
1980: JUL 
16. Litton Industries Inc. 
1978: MAY, JUN 
1979: MAY 
17. ~Donnell Douglas Corp. 
1978: APR, MAY 
1980: JAN, FEB, APR, JUl., AUG 
18. Mesa Petroleum Co. 
1978: ocr, t¥:JJ 
19. National Semicorxluctor Corp. 
1978: MAR 
1980: MAR, JUN, JUL 
20. Syntex Corp. 
1978: t¥:JJ , DEC 
1980: MAY, JUN 
2l. Tandy Corp. 
1978: JUl., AUG 
1979: JUL, AUG 
1980: JUL, AUG 
22. Teledyne Inc. 
1977: ocr 
1978: JAI.'II , JUi. 
1979: JAI.'II 
1980: JAN, APR 
23. Texas Instruments Inc. 
1978: JAN, FEB 
1980: JAN, FEB, JUL, AUG 
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APPEI.'IDIX 6 
Stock and 9ption CCmlnission Schedule 
Amount of Purchase 
Under :;i5,000 
$5,000 - $15,000 
Oller $15,000 
iImount of Purchase 
Under :;i3,000 
$3,000 - $10,000 
Oller $10,000 
STOCK 
Comuission on Purchase 
$28 + .008 (:;iilmount) 
$28 + .006 ($iImount) 
$28 + .004 ($Amount) 
Comnission on Purchase 
:;i28 + .013 ($iImount) 
$28 + .010 ($iImount) 
$28 + .007 ($iImount) 
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